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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis attempts to illustrate how social capital facilitates innovation, leading to 
economic development and how this conceptualization of social capital provides the 
basis for innovation policy within the European Union.  Social capital embedded within 
the local economy contributes to economic development by facilitating innovation 
through the bonds of trust created by shared values and norms, face-to-face contact, and 
learning.  The EU endeavors to create a dynamic, competitive and innovative Europe 
through a knowledge-based economy.  The main objective of this paper is to identify the 
concepts which support this endeavor by establishing innovation policy based on 
collaborative networks in clusters within the European Union.   
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ÖZET 
 
 
Bu tezin amacı, sosyal sermayenin inovasyonu ne şekilde kolaylaştırdığını, ekonomik 
gelişime nasıl ışık tuttuğunu, ve sosyal sermaye konseptinin Avrupa Birliği içerisindeki 
inovasyon politikaları için nasıl bir temel oluşturduğunu izah etmeye çalışmaktır. Lokal 
ekonomilerde yer alan sosyal sermaye, ekonomik gelişime; paylaşılan değerler ve 
kurallar, yüz-yüze yapılan çalışmalar ve birbirinden öğrenme yoluyla oluşturulan güven 
bağlarının inovasyonu kolaylaştırması yoluyla katkıda bulunmaktadır. Avrupa Birliği, 
bilgiye dayalı bir ekonomi oluşturarak; dinamik, rekabetçi, ve yenilikçi bir Avrupa 
oluşturulması çabasındadır. Tezimizin ana amacı, bu çabayı, Avrupa Birliği içerisinde 
bulunan kümelerdeki işbirliği ağlarını temel alan bir inovasyon politikasının 
oluşturulması yoluyla destekleyen konseptlerin ortaya konmasıdır.   
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CHAPTER I:  INTRODUCTION 
 
Innovation is the process by which technological advances in products and 
processes are commercialized and diffused throughout society.  Innovation occurs more 
fluidly in an environment conducive to physical interfacing of participants to spread 
knowledge and ideas from one organization to another.  Social capital facilitates 
innovation, which leads to economic development.   
Social capital embedded within the local economy contributes to economic 
development by facilitating innovation through the bonds of trust created through 
shared values and norms, face-to-face contact, and learning.  These socio-cultural 
factors establish a foundation for economic activity.  In a globalized world, where more 
factors of production are mobile, the immobile relational resources which are embedded 
territorially support the reality of functioning networks.  Relationships based on 
collaboration and cooperation, as well as institutional capacities continue to increase in 
importance in sustaining competitive advantage (Amin & Thrift, 1994; Storper, 1995; 
Hudson, 1998; Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Bagnasco, 1999; Evans & Syrett, 2007). 
At the heart of the Lisbon Strategy is a need to foster an environment conducive 
to innovation, which is the commercialization of technological advances.  The Lisbon 
Strategy places emphasis on the need for an innovative Europe, “The most dynamic and 
competitive knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic 
growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion, and respect for the 
environment by 2010."  The main objective of this paper is to identify the concepts 
which support establishing innovation policy based on collaborative networks in 
clusters within the European Union.  A case study of Italy with a long tradition of trust 
and social capital in the northern Third Italy illustrates the role of social capital in 
creating opportunities for knowledge transfer through clusters and ultimately to greater 
economic development.  This paper will attempt to illustrate the theoretical validation 
for EU innovation policy focused on clusters through a comprehensive review of the 
relevant subject material, as well as enumerate the policies, policy trends, goals and 
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legislation of the EU related to innovation.   
In Chapter II, I attempt to highlight the relevant literature to the topic of this 
paper and to formulize working definitions of innovation, clusters and social capital.  A 
review of the literature on inter-institutional cooperation to advance innovation and 
technology in order to achieve a competitive advantage diverges on theoretical 
approaches, which span the faculties of economics and management.  Three basic 
branches of the research approach the issue framed by a different research question.  
First, research of a teleological nature delves into the origins of social networks. A 
second area of research aims to measure the effectiveness of inter-institutional 
networks.  Finally, a branch of research focuses on composition of clusters.  The 
functioning of free markets alone cannot guarantee a sustainable competitive advantage 
for nations or regions competing in a global environment.  In the neoclassical growth 
theories, focusing on the firm as the primary agent to achieve economies of scale, 
productivity and international competitiveness overlooks the value added by local actor 
networks, knowledge accumulation and local entrepreneurship (Cappellin, 2003a, p. 
73).  Clusters exhibit the benefits of social capital and knowledge exchange.   
EU innovation policy aims toward convergence by eliminating stark 
socioeconomic differences of diverse regions in the Common Market.  By exploring 
Bartolini's concept of subnational particularism in Chapter III, I will attempt to illustrate 
how EU policy substantiates yet contradicts the phenomenon of territorial 
differentiation.  While the EU espouses a social agenda to correct the natural imbalances 
of regional resource distribution, perhaps the monolithic juggernaut of the economic 
common market, misses the more nuanced opportunities afforded by specialization of 
policy strategy to meet the specific needs of regions.  Current trends in innovation 
policy address these opportunities.  
The question of allocation of resources resounds as the EU must determine 
where to funnel cohesion funds.  While economic progress was reinforced through 
infrastructural projects in the past, the challenge has evolved into a need for deeper 
development of social networks.  In Chapter IV, I review how Putnam’s discussion of 
Third Italy reflects the influence of history on clusters.   Putnam (1994) reflects on the 
fact that ‘’for economic progress social capital may be even more important than 
physical or human capital'' (Putnam, 1994, p. 183 – emphasis added).  One intriguing 
policy area remains innovation policy, more specifically innovation cluster policy.  The 
field of innovation clusters is multi-disciplinary, spanning political science, economics, 
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economic geography, management, sociology - just to mention a few.  Robert Putnam in 
Making Democracy Work discusses social capital.  The role of social capital in the 
interchange of knowledge significantly increases in order to maintain a competitive 
industry.
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CHAPTER II:  DEFINITIONS AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1   Defining Innovation 
‘’Innovation is the ability to take new ideas and translate them into commercial 
outcomes by using new processes, products or services in a way that is better and faster 
than the competition’’ (Bendis & Byler, 2009).  Innovation can be described from 
multiple angles, depending on the point of perspective and the methodology of analysis.  
An economic definition focuses on the factors of production and growth.  Schumpeter 
describes innovation as a change in the economic system causing voluntary investment.   
Schumpeter makes a distinction between induced investment and autonomous 
investment in his model explaining economic development.  The latter is sparked by 
innovation.1     Broadly speaking, Schumpeter proposed that autonomous investment 
was based on innovation, which can be referred to as resource discovery and/or 
technological progress.  Innovation could be viewed as any change in the production 
function which would increase output.  According to Schumpeter, innovation was the 
implementation of anything new, whether the something new is a product, natural 
resource, process, and market or market segment.  A biography of Schumpeter written 
by Thomas K. McCraw (2007) offers a portentous title of Schumpeter’s influence in the 
field of economic thought, particularly capitalism, Prophet of Innovation – Joseph 
                                                
1 ‘’Development in our sense is then defined by the carrying out of new combinations. 
This concept covers the following five cases: (1) the introduction of a new good-that is, 
once with which consumers are not yet familiar-or of a new quality of a good.  (2) The 
introduction of a new method of production, that is, one not yet tested by experience in 
the branch of manufacture concerned, which need by no means be founded upon a 
discovery scientifically new, and can also exist in a new way of handling a commodity 
commercially.  (3)  The opening of a new market, that is, a market into which the 
particular branch of manufacture o the country in question has not previously entered, 
whether or not this market has exited before.  (4)  The conquest of a new source of 
supply of raw materials, or half-manufactured goods, again irrespective of whether this 
soruce already exists or whether it has first to be created.  (5)  The carrying out of the 
new organization of any industry, like the creation of a monopoly position (for example 
through trustification) or the breaking up of a monopoly position’’ (Schumpeter, 1934, 
p. 66). 
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Schumpeter and Creative Destruction.  McCraw divides the book into three parts 
according to the intellectual journey of Schumpeter:  the economics of capitalism, 
capitalism’s social structure, and economics’ historical record (McCraw, 2007, p. xi).  
Schumpeter’s emphasis on the role of entrepreneurs, as well as the social structure and 
cultural institutions conducive to facilitate the creation and functioning of these 
entrepreneurs, leads in perfectly with the role of innovation for economic development.  
The roots of present day thinking about capitalism and economic growth can be traced 
back to Schumpeter.  Echoes of Schumpeter’s arguments can be heard when Cappellin 
(2003b) reasons that the basis for an expansive economy rests on the process of 
innovation. ‘’Economic growth depends on competitiveness and hence on innovation or 
on the speed of change of technologies and organizational routines.’’  (Cappellin, 2003b, 
p. 323).  ‘’Innovation is a key factor determining productivity growth’’ (Hollanders, 
2009, p. 5).   
Schumpeter’s digressions regarding creative destruction is directly related to the 
study of disruptive technologies, later called disruptive innovation, coined by Clayton 
Christensen.  Schumpeter’s view on creative destruction revealed that new advances 
will diminish the value of the preceding technology; hence, destroying the practical 
application of a previous generation of a product.  In describing the reasons for the 
popularity of a cluster emphasis in industrial policy during the 1990s in the majority of 
European countries, Borrás and Tsagdis (2008) explain that ‘’flexibility and ‘creative 
destruction’ of local production systems were important means of job creation as well as 
responses to the challenges of globalization’’ (p. 2).  A disruptive innovation is any new 
product or process which overtakes the previous generation in the marketplace.  Later 
researchers attempt to identify the sources and hindrances of the creation of disruptive 
innovations.   
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Source:  Disruptive Library Technology Jester. Pocket-sized Graph of the Theory of 
Disruptive Innovation  http://dltj.org/article/disruptive-innovation-card/  Accessed 
January 29, 2010.  
Figure 1:  Disruptive Innovation 
 
In his creation of a conceptual model to identify the inhibitors or blockages of 
firms to adopt disruptive innovation, Assink identifies the crucial role of innovation in 
creating value for the originating organization.  Innovation is ‘’(t)he process of 
successfully creating something new that has significant value to the relevant unit of 
adoption’’ (Assink, 2006, p. 217).  It should be noted that Assink makes the distinction 
in the paper between incremental and disruptive innovations.  Disruptive technologies 
play a crucial role in making the previous generation of a technology obsolete.  The 
extinction of older technologies propels an economy forward.  Innovation is the key to 
growth both for companies and for economies.  Inventions may produce a product, but 
if the product cannot replace the current products in the market, it cannot be an 
innovation.  For example, e-book personal devices, such as the Amazon Kindle or the 
Sony Reader, are an invention.  The e-book personal devices have not taken hold in the 
market place, despite Sony introducing the product back in the 1990s.  Part of the 
barriers to the success of the product becoming a disruptive technology remains the gap 
between market demand and the supply.  The technology has not yet reached a breaking 
point to dominate the market place.  Assink would refer to this as an exogenous 
infrastructural barrier.  Although his model’s unit of analysis is the large multi-national 
company and most of his explanatory variables are endogenous and internal to the 
firms, the conceptual model of disruptive innovation inhibitors mentions how external 
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market factors and cultural factors may inhibit the successful launching of disruptive 
technologies.  Though Assink does not explicitly state a role for innovation policy 
within government agencies, certain variables in his model, such as risk adverse climate 
and the learning gap incorporating a lack of creativity and lack of market sensing and 
foresight, imply a role for policy to address the creation of a business climate that may 
bear some of the financial burden of innovation as well as the creation of educational 
institutions to build a workforce capable of being creative and making tools to better 
sense the market conditions and trends as well as promoting arenas to create social 
capital. 
Different institutions of the European Union espouse different connotations to 
the term innovation.  The European Cluster Memorandum (2007) suggests that 
innovation is ‘’the transformation of ideas in new products and services’’ (p. 1).  The 
definition of innovation listed on the European Commission Enterprise and Industry 
follows along the lines of Schumpeter.  ‘’An innovation is the implementation of a new 
or significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing 
method, or a new organizational method in business practices, workplace organization 
or external relation. The minimum requirement for an innovation is that the product, 
process, marketing method or organizational method must be new (or significantly 
improved) to the firm.’’2   ‘’All forms of innovation need to be promoted, for innovation 
comes in many forms other than technological innovation, including organizational 
innovation and innovation in services. In this context, while increased competition 
constitutes the most efficient instrument to stimulate innovation, policy measures and 
innovation support mechanisms may also have an important role to play’’ (European 
Commission, 2006).   In the Commission document, ‘’An innovation-friendly, modern 
Europe’’ COM(2006) 589 final, innovation is understood as ‘’renewing and extending 
the range of products and services; establishing new methods of design, production, 
supply and distribution; and changing management and work organization, as well as 
the working conditions and skills of the workforce.’’3   
                                                
2 Accessed on January 28, 2010  
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/glossary/index_en.htm 
3 Accessed on January 29, 2010 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/research_innovation/general_framework/i23034
_en.htm  
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In summary, innovation could be understood as the implementation of something 
new, in which the implementing process brings value to the originating unit, whether 
firm, individual, nation-state, regional institution or other organizational structure. 
The concept of innovation has shifted from a linear process to a systematic 
approach, meaning that participation of multiple areas of an organization are required 
instead of just a research and development (R&D) department.  Previously, innovation 
was conceptualized as taking place in a lab with scientist in white lab coats, tinkering  to 
discover new processes and create new products.  The Schumpeterian view of 
innovation regards firms producing innovation in isolation through their entrepreneurs 
instead of a systemic approach viewing innovation as a complex process (Pellegrin, 
2007, p. 204).  The transformation of the formulation of what and how innovation 
works has envisioned a dynamic reality that involves actors at multiple layers in the 
process. Innovation can no longer be conceived of as an isolated activity, but as 
something kinetic requiring the input of several stakeholders.  Innovation is not only 
creating something new, but creating something new which can be brought to market or 
contribute to the advancement of the units, organizations or institutions generating the 
innovation.  Invention on the other hand may take place to produce something new, but 
if that something new is not implemented to create value, the invention cannot be 
considered as innovation. 
Innovation requires input from the cross section of interested stakeholders. The 
firm must consult with marketing to assess the pulse of trends and demands for goods.  
Finance must be involved to secure the resources for research.  Scientists and technical 
experts must be equipped to identify customer requirements in order to produce a 
marketable product and to cater to the specific needs of the end users.  A looping effect 
occurs in the dynamic conceptualization of innovation.  Feedback and iterations of 
interaction are required to leverage the pockets of knowledge spread throughout the 
value chain.  Knowledge is produced and diffused in a more cooperative fashion taking 
advantage of an aggregated knowledge set.  Moreover, innovation can occur in a cross-
firm or cross-institutional setting in which face-to-face contact helps to diffuse tacit 
knowledge, that knowledge which is not easily conveyed through written 
documentation but remains locked in the experiences and advice of colleagues and 
collaborators.  Human-to-human interactions are required to convey tacit knowledge.   
Innovation has arrived at a social process, during which stakeholders engage in 
dynamic iterative encounters to transfer knowledge which aggregates into a final 
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product, process or service.  Needless to say, networking has evolved into a critical 
element of innovative production.  The broader the network of stakeholders, the easier it 
is to identify a resource with the specific information to overcome gaps in the 
knowledge base.  Networks also allow ideas and technology to be diffused through the 
economy more efficiently.  Knowledge may be spread more collectively and at a faster 
pace.   Institutions figure prominently in the process, whether formal or informal.  
Organizations provide the rules, norms, and behavior by which individuals in the 
network associate with each other.  Pooled resources providing different functions in 
isolation form a network to diffuse know-how and coordinate economic players within 
networks.  Institutions can provide a critical element in removing hindrances and 
barriers for firms, organizations and individuals to access the required resources, such as 
financing or easier navigation of national or localized bureaucracy.  The EU recognizes 
the open process and collaborative nature of innovation.4 
2.2   Defining Social Capital 
Collaboration and cooperation which are favorable to the process of innovation 
require banked social capital.  Social capital provides the basis for the effective 
functioning of a network embedded within a location.  The notion of social capital is 
attractive to many economic development theorists, since it addresses the often 
overlooked element of a social dimension in the economic development process. 
One of the consequences of socializing social capital is that networks, norms and 
identities are rescued from relegation. There is a welcome irony in the fact that 
when this is done we seem to learn more about economic development than we do 
when working with the reductionist conceptions of economics. It seems that by 
refusing to succumb to the logic of economic rationality we might begin to 
understand more about the way in which development occurs. (Fevre, 2000, p. 
109). 
 
This is not to say that the concept of social capital is easily defined nor its 
                                                
4 ‘’Innovation is increasingly characterised as an open process, in which many different 
actors—companies, customers, investors, universities, and other organisations—
cooperate in a complex ways. Ideas move across institutional boundaries more 
frequently. The traditional linear model of innovation with clearly assigned roles for 
basic research at the university, and applied research in a company R&D centre, is no 
longer relevant. Innovation can benefit from geographic proximity which facilitates the 
flows of tacit knowledge and the unplanned interactions that are critical parts of the 
innovation process. This is one of the reasons why innovation occurs locally whereas its 
benefits spread more widely through productivity gains’’ (European Commission, 2007, 
p. 4).  
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definition agreed upon.  Debates continue in the literature over the notion of social 
capital (Woolcock, 1998; Baron et al., 2000; Dasgupta and Serageldin, 2000; Fine, 
2001; ONS, 2001b; Halpern, 2005).   In the conventional sense, capital is regarded as 
something tangible, such as land, labor, and finances.  The 1960s saw the dawn of the 
concept of human capital, which is basically the education and health of workers, who 
apply the previous forms of capital (Becker, 1964).  Social capital brings an additional 
dimension to the concept of human capital, ‘‘whereas human capital resides in 
individuals, social capital resides in relationships’’ (Woolcock, 2001a, p. 12).  Social 
capital can thus be viewed as a productive resource.  Economists normally view human 
capital and social capital as a type of externality or spillover.   
Uphoff (2000) offers two perspectives on the concept of social capital, both 
objective and subjective.  Firstly, there is a structural version of social capital stressing 
networks, linkages and organizations for information and norms to be transferred.  This 
sociological perspective is based on the research of Coleman (1988, 1990).  Secondly, 
there is a cognitive version stressing shared norms, values, trust, attitudes and beliefs.  
Putnam’s (1994) work, a political science perspective, represents this perspective 
(Evans & Syrett, 2007, p. 58).  Bourdieu describes social capital as ‘’ "the aggregate of 
the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of 
more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition" 
(1983, p. 249).  Bourdieu’s definition emphasizes the value which can be derived from 
relational interactions on an accrued basis.  By relaying the realizable tangible economic 
benefits of social capital for the parties involved, Bourdieu’s reflection on the concept 
supports the intentional formation of social interactions to develop the resource of social 
capital.  Fukuyama provides a more general description of social capital as “shared 
norms or values that promote social cooperation, instantiated in actual social 
relationships” (2002, p. 27).  For economic development to succeed and economic 
growth to increase, Fukuyama argues that social capital is an indispensable 
precondition.  Members of networks benefit from the value created through social 
capital, such as the positive external effect of knowledge sharing.  Self-reinforcing 
constructive encounters can be fueled by underlying cultural influences and institutions.  
Social capital established through membership in an assortment of community-based 
institutions, artisan and commercial associations, and labor organizations laid the 
groundwork for commercial inter-organization exchanges in the Italian industrial 
districts.  Formal and informal diffusion of information occurs when employees change 
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companies, visit similar social events, or engage in activities of their school children.  
Clusters such as Silicon Valley benefit from these informal, market-led, spontaneous 
communication channels (Andersson et al, 2004, p. 20).  Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) 
view innovation and knowledge creation as a social process involving individuals who 
swap both explicit and tacit knowledge.  Innovation commences with a group level 
comprehension or identification as the foundation for collaboration.  Storper (1999) 
discusses how decentralized horizontal cooperation of individuals across and within 
institutions and firms is enabled by trust based relationships and social capital.  ‘’The 
growth of a locally embedded innovation system is essential in shaping the social 
routines and strategies of actors in the regional economy’’ (Öz, 2004, p. 16).  
Cappellin’s approach of territorial knowledge management identifies fives policy tasks, 
one of which is to ‘’lever common identity.’’   His definition of the task relates to a 
cultural explanatory variable: ‘’The change in the corporate culture to promote 
knowledge sharing and the willingness to collaborate. That requires common aims, 
shared mental models, trust and loyalty and also the morale, empowerment and 
commitment of people’’ (Cappellin, 2003b, p. 322). 
 
 
Source: Riemer and Klein (2003) 
Figure 2:  Social capital as a necessary complement to human capital for successful 
collaboration 
 
Dissimilar to other forms of capital, such as financial, the more social capital is 
used or applied the greater and stronger it grows and is amplified.  Social capital is only 
as strong as the resources, such as land, labor, financial or human capital, which can be 
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leveraged through the interpersonal or inter-organizational network.  Riemer and Klein 
illustrate the pairing of human capital and social capital to achieve successful 
collaboration.  Increasing the frequency and number of interactions between parties in a 
network increases the strength of the network.  Local economic development can 
benefit from social capital banked within networks in order to leverage available 
immobile resources.  Social capital can be a catalyst for innovation within the network 
of a cluster, leading to improved economic development. 
 
2.3   Discussing Agglomeration and Competitive Advantage 
Economic theories have traditionally been devoid of quantifiable variables to 
account for location of economic production or for the value of human interactions in 
networks.  While Schumpeter’s model present the powerful dynamics of innovation as a 
carrot for autonomous investment, as well as the critical role which entrepreneurs 
occupy in the value creation process derived from innovation,  his model does not 
address the crucial role played by location.  Political and economic theorists such as 
Adam Smith and Alfred Marshall brought the concept of a spatial element to 
competition to the forefront.  Particularly Alfred Marshall in the 1890s brought the 
concept of geographic concentrations of industries to the attention of academics (Öz, 
2004, p. xi).  Alfred Marshall, writing during the late nineteenth century, introduced his 
observation of ‘the concentration of specialized industries in particular localities.’  His 
discussion focuses on three externalities of the localized agglomeration, mainly, ‘’the 
ready availability of skilled labor, the growth of supporting and ancillary trades, and the 
specialization of different firms in different stages and branches of production’’ (Martin 
& Sunley, 2003, p. 7).  It was not until a century later, when Porter delves into the 
source of national competitive advantage and international competitiveness that the 
concepts of localized agglomeration as a source of economic development exploded 
onto the academic and business scene.  Discussion of agglomeration of economic 
activity would be remiss without a discussion of Porter’s contributions to the 
understanding and popularization of the cluster phenomenon.  Porter’s demonstration of 
the competitive diamond model proved to have staying power in explaining the 
significance of location in regards to economic activity.   The diamond model identifies 
four core drivers of competitive advantage.  The model identifies competitiveness as a 
function of four endogenous variables, including advanced and specialized production 
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factors, demand conditions, context for firm strategies, structure and rivalry, and lastly, 
related and supporting industries, which can be termed clusters.  Exogenous factors 
address the influence of government policy on the four variables in the diamond model, 
as well as the influence of chance, trajectories or junctures, events, war, disruptive 
technologies, and natural catastrophes.  Results from the Innobarometer 2009 conducted 
by the Gallup Organization reveals that competition and demand conditions more 
strongly influence innovation than push factors.   
   Demand-pull factors (e.g. pressure from competitors, demands from clients) 
were more likely than technology-push factors (i.e. emergence of new 
technologies or opportunities to cooperate with knowledge centres) to positively 
influence innovation activities between 2006 and early 2009. Almost three-
quarters (72%) of enterprises indicated that at least one of the demand-pull factors 
tested in the survey influenced their innovation activity in a positive manner 
(Gallup, 2009, p. 11). 
 
Öz performs a comprehensive review of the evolution of Porter’s thoughts 
regarding clusters.  Porter’s book The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990) 
concentrates on the sources of international competitive advantage at the industry level.  
The study which involved over one hundred industries scattered throughout ten 
countries stumbled on the revelation that the sources of advantage lay in the local 
setting.  Competitive advantage of domestic or regional firms could be sustained 
through four local characteristics, mainly factor conditions, demand conditions, related 
and supporting industries and context for firm strategy and rivalry.  The four factors 
blend in a unique way that may be difficult to duplicate and reproduce in a different 
location, hence, creating a system with reinforcing sustainable attributes.  Öz points out 
that Porter’s later works in 1998 and 2000 reveal his argument that clusters are a 
manifestation of the diamond theory.  Öz also states that Porter claims that the origin of 
a geographic cluster may often be traced back to irreplaceable historical circumstances 
or to a distinctively sophisticated local demand.  The interpretation of Öz implies a 
lock-in effect of previously established factor conditions or institutional formation.  
‘’Once a cluster begins to form a self-reinforcing cycle promotes its growth since 
talented individuals are attracted by success stories, specialist suppliers emerge, 
information accumulates and local institutions develop specialized training 
programmes, research facilities and infrastructure’’ (Öz, 2004, p. 25).  Martin and 
Sunley (2003) pronounce that Porter purports clusters both as an analytical concept to 
understand the competitive advantages of localization of economic activity as well as a 
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key policy tool to strengthen programs for policy-makers at all levels from international 
organizations, national governments, regional development agencies, to local or city 
governments (p. 6).  Porter becomes more convinced over time that geographical 
concentration or clustering of firms increases the advantages of the interchanges of the 
four elements of the competitive diamond model.  ‘’The competitive diamond is the 
driving force making for cluster development, and simultaneously the cluster is the 
spatial manifestation of the competitive diamond’’ (p. 7). 
 
 
Source: Porter (2001) 
Figure 3:  Porter's Diamond Model 
 ‘’(T)he failure of economics to take account of space’’ (p. 29)  is a decisive 
statement of Paul Krugman (1995) in his series of Ohlin lectures at the Stockholm 
School of Economics during the fall of 1992, in which he builds towards a theory of 
spatial economics utilizing an approach based on the assumption of the value of 
location. Though Keynesian economic theory separates itself from neoclassical 
economics by supporting a role for the government through fiscal and monetary policy, 
Keynesian economic models often fall short of incorporating a variable to address the 
pertinent effect of space or location.  The question of ‘’where’’ spawns realms of 
theoretic thought, such as ‘’…economic geography – the study of where economic 
activity takes place and why…’’  (Fujita et al, 1999, p. 1).  The phenomenon of 
‘’(a)gglomeration – the clustering of economic activity, created and sustained by some 
sort of circular logic – occurs at many levels, from the local shopping districts that serve 
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surrounding residential areas within cities to specialized economic regions like Silicon 
Valley (or the City of London) that serve the world market as a whole’’ (Fujita et al, 
1999, p. 1).  Krugman and his crew of spatial economists, who commandeered the term 
‘’new economic geography’’ would have us believe that economics of agglomeration 
prove to be theoretically tautological.  ‘’Broadly speaking, all these concentrations form 
and survive because of some form of agglomeration economies, in which spatial 
concentration itself creates the favorable economic environment that supports further or 
continued concentration’’ (Fujita et al, 1999, p. 4).   
While Krugman, Fujita and Venables resurrected the concept of location 
economics with the help of established quantitative models, such as the von Thünen 
Model, the Core-Periphery Model, and the Dixit-Stiglitz Model of Monopolitistic 
Competition, economic geographers of the prior generational ilk seek to validate their 
theories of the ‘’where’’ question with more qualitative case studies.  ‘’Economic 
geographers’’ find contention with the tendency of the ‘’new economic geographers’’ to 
generalize with grand theories of agglomeration causes and effects glazing over the 
potentially powerful explanatory nature of nuanced socio-cultural developments 
married to location.  Martin (1999) in his editorial readily offers a solution.  ‘’We 
(economic geographers) need to convince economists as to the significance of these 
spatial inhomogeneities and specificities: that socio-institutional factors are central 
determinants of the development of the economic landscape, not just background 
'noise'’’ (Martin, 1999, p. 388).   
Modeling of socio-institutional factors remains a cumbersome task; therefore, 
the camp of economists falling into categories such as the ‘’new economic geography’’ 
gains traction in the halls of policy makers.  ‘’The field (economic geography) has been 
given a big boost in particular by plans to unify the European market and the attempt to 
understand how this deeper integration will work by comparing international economics 
within Europe with interregional economics within the United States’’ (Fujita et al, 
1999, p. 2).  Marin and Sunley (2003) also suggest that Porter’s packaging of 
agglomeration concentration advantages vis-à-vis clusters is more easily received and 
implemented by policy makers, due to posing the phenomenon in relation to ‘’an 
overarching focus on the determinants of ‘competitiveness’ (of firms, industries, nations 
and now locations).  This resonates closely with the growing emphasis given by 
politicians and policy-makers to the importance of competitiveness for succeeding in 
today’s global economy’’ (p. 8).   
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Source: Cappellin, R. (2003b). p. 311.  
Figure 4: Cappellin’s territorial knowledge management approach.  Learning and 
knowledge creation as indicators and drivers of economic development processes. 
 
Jumping back to the cumbersome task of modeling socio-institutional factors in 
economic models, the literature examines the role of networks since tracing a direct 
impact of networks on economic performance is complex. ‘’Because intangibles are, by 
nature, difficult to measure and to value, the lack of reliable, comprehensive and 
internationally comparable data is a major barrier to empirical analysis’’ (Peneder, 2000, 
p. 117).  Still economists attempt to account for these intangible proclivities of human 
interaction and its significance for economic development.  ‘’The model of the 
territorial networks indicates that the process of economic development is the result of 
the tight interaction between the process of local networking and of the process of 
interregional and international networking’’ (Cappellin, 2003a, p. 70).  Certain schools 
of economic thought stretch beyond the confines of neoclassical and Keynesian models 
to create generalizable theories to capture the intricacies of the value of knowledge 
interchange among individuals.  Cappellin, who studies the economics of technological 
change as well as the relationships and roles of public institutions within federal 
systems, developed the model of territorial networks to address the connectivity 
between the flows of production factors, technology and production and between the 
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flows of goods, labor, capital and technology.  Cappellin (2003a) identifies several 
relevant networks in a local production system.5 
   These complex interactions between the six variables considered by the model 
of territorial networks indicate that the negative or positive impact on economic 
development of an increasing openness to the international or interregional 
economy may be very different in the various regions.  The final outcome depends 
mainly on the process of networking between the local actors, the interactive 
process of knowledge accumulation within the region considered and the local 
entrepreneurship capabilities in the creation of new firms.  These three factors are 
basically disregarded in the neoclassical growth theories, which in contrast focus 
mainly on the impact of the remaining three variables: economies of scale, 
productivity and international competitiveness (Cappellin, 2003a, p. 73). 
 
Cappellin (2003b) also introduces another approach which he terms territorial 
knowledge management to measure ‘’the cognitive dimension of agglomeration 
economies’’ (p. 323).  ‘’Territorial knowledge management means the generation of a 
system of procedures and incentives to convert tacit and localized knowledge into 
explicit knowledge available to all companies and employees in a region by overcoming 
cognitive barriers’’ (Cappellin, 2003b, p. 303).  Cappellin touches upon the vital role of 
knowledge management since ‘’knowledge contributes to the adoption of organizational 
and technological innovation within existing firms and the creation of new firms (start-
ups or spin-offs) incorporating the new technologies’’ (p. 322).  Knowledge is the 
contributing factor to the adoption of organizational innovation.  Cappellin’s research 
focuses on the spatial dimension of the innovation process which he claims take place in 
clusters of SMEs.  Cappellin’s approach of the critical role played by SMEs may come 
into contention with the model of Assink, whose unit of analysis is large multi-
nationals.  Additionally, Assink focuses on disruptive innovation instead of incremental 
developments at which Cappellin’s unit of analysis the SMEs tend to be more adept.  
Assink’s conceptual model of disruptive innovation inhibitors and Cappelin’s approach 
of territorial knowledge management do similarly recognize the added value dimensions 
of innovation to the originating unit and the importance of removing impediments to the 
flow of knowledge. 
                                                
5 Technological integration, Integration of the local labor market, Production integration 
between the firms, Integration between the service sectors adn the manufacturing firms, 
Financial integration of the firms, Territorial integration at the local level, Social and 
cultural integration, Relationships of institutional integration, and Territorial integration 
at the interregional and international level (Cappellin, 2003a, p. 55). 
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2.3.1   Types of Agglomeration 
Researchers of the phenomenon of agglomeration, use varied terminology often 
interchangeably. A distinction must be made here between the terms cluster, industrial 
district (ID), network and regional innovation system (RIS).  To clarify what this paper 
refers to as clusters, is it critical to review the various elements of clusters.   
Sölvell identifies clusters as one of four types of agglomeration.  Using four 
categories along two dimensions, the first from efficiency advantages to innovation 
advantages and the second from agglomeration in general to agglomeration of 
technologically related actors (Sölvell, 2009, p. 13).  The first and most general form of 
agglomeration are cities, in which diverse activities can achieve efficiency advantages 
or economies of scale through efficiency and flexibility of inputs, including labor and 
capital.  The second type of agglomeration identified is creative regions, in which 
diverse activities are carried out with innovation advantages.  The third type is industrial 
districts, where technologically related activities take place with the advantages of 
efficiency and flexibility.  The fourth and final form identified by Sölvell is clusters, 
where there is an overlap of the innovation advantages and agglomeration of 
technologically related actors. 
 
 
Source: Sölvell (2009). 
Figure 5: Four Types of Agglomeration 
 
Öz (2004) attempts to make a distinction among industrial districts, networks 
and clusters.  Her review of definitions for industrial districts (ID) brings out a few 
common elements in the definitions.  The first factor seemingly common to all 
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definitions is that IDs are comprised of SMEs or small family-owned businesses, thus 
there is flexibility in labor inputs.  Another common element is production of a similar 
product, sometimes with forward and/or backward linkages between the firms.  And a 
third element, which seems to be similar, is naturally a geographic concentration.  Most 
of the definitions cited by Öz seem to lack a catch-all element to incorporate formal 
institutions, which sometimes accompany clusters.  In particular, A Marshallian 
industrial district, which is a concentration of specialized industries in particular 
localities, provides a source of resource exchange, not only of a specialized workforce 
but also of critical technology to achieve a competitive advantage (Öz, 2004, p. 1).  Öz 
(2004) points out that Capecchi stressed the presence of flexible specialization as well 
as small and medium-sized enterprises within industrial districts (p. 12).  Öz (2004) did 
catalog a definition gleaned from the new industrial districts (NID) literature, which 
alludes to the value of informal institutions, ‘’a district is a spatially concentrated cluster 
of sector specialized firms, with a strong set of forward and backward linkages, a 
common cultural and social background linking economic agents and creating a 
behavioral code, sometimes explicit but often implicit, and a network of public and 
private supporting institutions’’ (p. 9). Clusters may be distinguished from industrial 
districts on the factor of innovation advantages.  Though Öz may blur the delineation 
between the terms cluster and ID, she does set apart the functionality of networks, ‘’…a 
network is defined…as a set of high-trust relationships that are usually contractual and 
explicit’’ (Öz, 2004, p. 10). In her review of definitions for networks, she reveals that 
networks often require formal and explicit links between firms that lead to a cooperative 
environment.  Networks, unlike clusters, are not tied down to a specific geographical 
location.  Ho conceptualizes that all of Europe could be understood as a network, ‘’The 
whole Europe can be taken as a knowledge network that consists of different RISs 
possessing diversified resources’’ (Ho, 2009, p. 1881). 
 A ‘regional innovation system’ (RIS) is another term within the literature, which 
is often used interchangeable with the term ‘cluster.’  Howells (1999, p. 82) identifies 
fives processes of an innovation system.  Firstly, localized communication patterns 
relating to the innovation process occur simultaneously at the individual and the firm or 
group levels.  Secondly, search and scanning procedures relating to innovation and 
technology are localized.  Thirdly, learning and invention patterns tend to be localized.  
Fourthly, knowledge is shared locally.  Finally, innovation performance happens locally.  
In addition to the role of interactions between  local actors within a territorial system, 
20 
 
Ho (2009) adds to the description of an RIS,  ‘’The combination of the sophisticated 
needs of customers, technical expertise in suppliers, implicit rules or cultural norms and 
institutional factors leads to a dynamic learning economy’’ (p. 1883).  Ho also adds that 
the knowledge base existing within the RIS serves to attract FDI and R&D investment 
from multinational organizations.  The European Commission looks at a regional 
system of innovation as policy with the objective of regional and business development 
through a multi-dimensional approach, ‘’different methods may be used, ranging from 
hands-on methods, like providing information, contacts, assistance, advice or direct 
funding to hands-off methods, like lobbying, marketing, monitoring and reporting’’ 
(European Commission, 2007, p. 16).  RIS expand beyond firm involvement, implying 
some form of policy creation and government institutions. 
2.4   Defining Clusters  
‘’The emergence of any cluster in the first place is intrinsically related to 
innovation. As clusters evolve over time, however, forces of change both within the 
cluster itself and its location, and in the external environment, may bring changes that 
serve to challenge the continued development of the cluster. Success in maintaining 
strong conditions for innovation is likely to be greatly important for avoiding decay and 
stagnation, and ultimately for the survival of clusters. It is conceivable that today, and 
even more likely in the future, all long-living clusters will have to be continuously 
innovative in one way of the other. While innovative clusters may thus be a tautology, 
the link between clusters and innovation is critically important. The notion of innovative 
clusters is associated with their connection to the driving forces of innovation’’ 
(Andersson et al, 2004, p. 39). 
A generally accepted and comprehensive definition of clusters proves to be 
elusive.  One’s chosen definition is dependent upon the perspective from which one 
chooses to analyze the phenomenon.  Oftentimes definitions reflect an ideal type instead 
of reality, devolving to best-fit endeavors and toiling case-by-case.  As of yet, there is no 
silver bullet in cluster theory to capture the specific a priori elements of the formation of 
different clusters under different settings (Martin & Sunley, 2003, p. 16).  
Agglomeration studies incorporate conceptual frameworks from a diverse group of 
theories including ‘’Marshallian theory, location theory, transaction-cost and 
institutional theory, international business theory, regional studies, and strategic 
management’’ (Wolfe & Lucas, 2005, p. 4).   
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‘’Clustering is generally defined as a process of firms and other actors co-
locating within a concentrated geographical area, cooperating around a certain 
functional niche, and establishing close linkages and working alliances to improve their 
collective competitiveness’’ (Andersson et al, 2004, p. 7). 
A definition of clusters from an economic perspective would focus on the main 
drivers of competitiveness and growth.  Martin and Sunley (2003) point out the two 
main characteristics of Porter’s definition for clusters.  Firstly, the firms within a cluster 
must be linked somehow.  Commonalities and complementarities link interconnected 
companies and associated institutions within clusters.  Linkages can be both vertical, 
focusing on buyer-seller process or horizontal, the use of comparable specialized inputs, 
technologies or institutions, among other linkages.  Networks or social relationships 
play a role within the cluster producing mutual benefits for the actors.  Secondly, a 
cluster is characterized by geographically proximate groups of actors.  Increased 
interaction between actors creates value-added benefits (p. 10).  Cappellin (2003b) 
simple refers to ‘’geographical clusters’’ as ‘’local production system’’ (p. 307).  
‘’Clusters may embody the characteristics of the modern innovation process: they can 
be considered as “reduced scale innovation systems” (European Commission, 2007, p. 
4).  ‘’We conceive a cluster as a regional agglomeration of sector or value chain related 
firms and other organizations (like universities, R&D centers, public agencies) which 
derive economic advantages from co-location and collaboration,’’ writes Fromhold-
Eisebeth and Eisebeth (2005, p. 1251).   
Borrás and Tsagdis discuss the minimum requirements agreed upon by the 
WEID (West-East Industrial Districts Re-location Processes: Identifying Policies in the 
Perspective of EU Enlargement) research team for a collection of firms and institutions 
to be considered a cluster.  Firstly, there must be a geographical concentration of firms, 
in particular industrial specialization.  Secondly, the number of SMEs must be greater 
than the number of large size enterprises.  Thirdly, there must be a presence of inter-firm 
and institutional networks (2008, p. 9). 
Gordon and McCann (2000) propose three ideal type models of clusters.  First 
up to bat is the ‘pure agglomeration economies’ model, resting on the external 
economies of geographical concentration and evolving from a Marshallian view through 
to modern urban economic theory.  Second on the batting roster is the ‘industrial 
complex’ model, reflecting a spatial equivalent to the input-output models or regional 
economics.  The ‘industrial complex’ model reflects geographical concentrations based 
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on links of inter-firm trading and the minimization of transaction costs.  Third up at bat 
is the ‘social-network’ model characterizes clusters from a cultural perspective centered 
on intense local networks or inter-personal relations, trust and institutionalized practices 
(Martin & Sunley, 2003, p. 16).  Sölvell (2009) identifies four key dimensions upon 
which clusters can be typified: type of agglomeration, level of dynamism, stage in the 
life cycle, and level of political involvement (p. 11).   Still other researchers emphasize 
the location aspects of an innovation area.   
Two elements which transcend the varied definitions remain the salience of 
geographical location and the significance of interconnectivity, cooperation or 
collaboration of firms and institutions within one or more analogous industries.  
Clusters for the purpose of this paper will be understood to incorporate knowledge 
spillovers leading to innovation.   
 
2.5   The Case for Policies for Clusters 
Clusters matter because of the demonstrated economic benefits to concentrated 
areas of innovation.  The European Cluster Memorandum (2007) indicates, ‘’Clusters – 
regional concentrations of specialized companies and institutions linked through 
multiple linkages and spillovers – provide and environment conducive to innovation’’ 
(p. 1).  EC (2007) explains that ‘’cluster policies’’ is an inaccurate term, as creating 
clusters is not the ultimate objective.  Policies supporting cluster development generally 
have a broader goal of strengthening regional and business development (European 
Commission, 2007, p. 16).    
Borrás and Tsagdis take ‘’the stance of regarding policy as an integral part in the 
daily life of clusters; in other words, the stance that policy is an unavoidable aspect of 
clusters’’ (2008, p. 1).  The pair regard policy as ‘’public action that can be performed 
by a series of public and semi-public actors’’ (Borrás & Tsagdis, 2008, p. 1).  The 
authors admittedly pronounce that their definition is broad but justify its catch-all nature 
by indicating that policies regarding clusters surface at the meeting point of ‘’a complex 
set of territorially embedded interactions between (public and semi-public) actors’’ (p. 
2). 
‘’(T)erritorial knowledge management may be defined as the policy aiming to 
enhance the innovation potential, the competitiveness and the economic growth of 
clusters or networks of SMEs by managing the interactive learning and knowledge 
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creation process’’  (Cappellin, 2003b, p. 322).  Cappellin identifies his approach of 
territorial knowledge management as offering a unique solution to policy regarding 
regional innovation and technology transfers.  His approach is not based on ‘’financial 
incentives to R&D, technology transfer centers, regional innovation strategies, science 
and technology parks, incubators or venture capital.  Territorial knowledge management 
is a methodology which aims to promote innovation within existing firms and the birth 
of innovative firms by enhancing the local endowment of intellectual capital, through a 
systematic action on those processes, which drive knowledge creation within the firms 
and between these latter and the local actors’’ (Cappellin, 2003b, p. 322).  Cappellin 
bases the relevance of his approach on the fact that ‘’small and medium size firms 
(SMEs) account for over 99% of all European businesses and in many fields provide the 
channels along which new technologies develop’’ (Cappellin, 2003b, p. 304).  Through 
the institutional development of learning and innovation networks, SMEs can increase 
their capabilities in innovation. 
The research of Fromhold-Eisebith and Eisebeth explores a similar dichotomy of 
cluster formation to that of Sölvell’s constructive or evolutionary forces.  ‘’Explicit top-
down cluster promotion appears to better address the material base and localization 
economies of a cluster, is more inclusive and expansive, and has wider regional 
economic impacts. Implicit top-down promotion suits better to support immaterial 
qualities of socially embedded interaction, creates stronger motivation among cluster 
members, and induces faster outcomes in terms of functional, innovation-related 
collaboration affecting firm performance’’ (Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebeth, 2005, 1265).  
The authors deliberately attempt not to make to make any judgment calls as to which 
type of cluster promotion approach is more effective.  Creating institutions to promote 
clusters from a top-down or bottom-up approach can be equally effective in achieving 
the architects’ objectives.  ‘’The two parallel processes: downwards towards more 
decentralization, and upwards towards more supra- and international involvement have 
created a complex picture of multi-level policy action and governance forms towards 
clusters and local production systems’’  (Borrás & Tsagdis, 2008, p. 3). 
To assume that cluster policy is a magic elixir to improve economic performance 
is false. The criticisms of skeptics pointing to the fact that cluster theory is still 
searching for a strong explanatory model help to identify areas of research to make the 
cluster policy argument stronger.  While theories, approaches and models such as multi-
level governance and new institutionalism may help to understand the phenomenon of 
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clusters, the normative basis for cluster formation remains elusive.  ‘’The assumptions 
that governance and MLG offer an important problem-solving capacity in contemporary 
complex capitalist societies have not been fully tested empirically, and today there is a 
relative lack of substantial analytical frameworks to examine the conditions under 
which such potential is fulfilled or not’’ (Borrás & Tsagdis, 2008, p. 3).  Borrás and 
Tsagdis attempt to answer two research questions dealing with the learning process.  
Firstly, does cluster MLG exhibit and learning dynamics?  Secondly, does MLG support 
cluster-learning dynamics?  They suggest that most literature on cluster policy and 
governance remains descriptive, normative and pragmatic, lacking any generalizable 
qualities. 
Venables (2001) suggests analyzing the agglomeration and cumulative causation 
of clusters as the tension between centripetal and centrifugal forces.  Centripetal forces 
encourage economic actors to locate near to one another, while centrifugal forces push 
economic actors away from each other.  Centripetal forces can be classified into three 
categories.  First of all are knowledge spillovers, which could also be termed as 
technological externalities.  Marshall (1920) used the phrase, ‘’the mysteries of the trade 
become no mysteries, but are, as it were, in the air…’’ Secondly, the effects of labor 
market pooling provide a fertile supply of readily available skilled workers.  Thirdly, 
linkages between buyers and sellers, both backwards (demand) linkages and forwards 
(supply) linkages, advance the positive interdependence and embeddedness between 
different firms, institutions and other economic actors.  Centrifugal forces such as 
congestion, pollution, and other externalities may compel economic actors to disperse.  
As immobile factors, such as land or the inflated costs associated with the concentration 
of skilled labor, become scarcer within the centers of economic activity, firms may be 
persuaded to locate outside the agglomeration.  Additionally, firms may wish to locate 
closer to a customer base outside of the clustered domain to reduce trade barriers or 
transport costs (Venables, 2001, pp. 211-212). 
Martin & Sunley (2003) critically review the fad-like nature of the plethora of 
cluster policies.  The duo brings up various negative impacts of clusters.  Technological 
isomorphism occurs as normative behavior sets into the agglomerated firms, meaning 
the firms begin to act like each other removing variety from the process o innovation.  
Network actors may slip into a lock-in effect generated from a dependence on face-to-
face contact for exchange of knowledge.  As over-specialization occurs, firms within the 
cluster may not be able to respond to rapidly changing conditions of global competition.  
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An intense clustering of firms may also lead to steep price increases in labor, land and 
housing costs, as such inputs are more immobile and limited.  Some critics argue that 
cluster based policy may also lead to wider gaps in income disparity.  Workers within 
the core cluster firms may garner higher wages to compensate for growing congestions.  
The segment of labor employed within the non-core activities of the cluster, may incur 
inferior real wages and experience lower living standards.  Additionally, congestion may 
stretch and create an imbalance over environmental concerns.  
Martin and Sunley (2003) are critical of the lack of clarity in definition for 
clusters provided by Porter over time, suggesting that no measurement guide is provided 
to delineate when an agglomeration is categorized as a cluster.   Enright (2003), a 
student of Michael Porter, provides a more comprehensive typology of dimensions, 
including geographic scope, density, breadth, depth, activity base, geographic span of 
sales, strength of competitive position, stage of development, the nature of the 
technological activities, innovative capacity, and ownership structure.6  Rosenfeld 
                                                
6 Enright’s (2003, p. 102) detailed explanations for dimensions of regional clusters 
include: 
• The geographic scope of a cluster refers to the territorial extenet of the firms, 
customers, suppliers, support services, and institutions that are embedded in the 
ongoing relationshıps and interdependent activities that characterize the cluster. 
• The density of the cluster refers to the shear number and economic weight (in 
terms of market shares of relevant industries) of the firms in the cluster. 
• The breadth of clusters refers to the range of horizontally related industries 
(industries related common technologies, end users, distribution channels, and 
other non-vertical relationships) within the cluster. 
• Cluster depth refers to range of veritcally related industries within the cluster, in 
particular whether the cluster contains all steps or only a few steps in a supply 
chain. 
• The activity base of a cluster involves the number and nature of the activities in 
the value added chain that are performed with the region. 
• The geographic span of sales provides an indication of the reach o the cluster. 
• The strength of competitive position of a cluster can range from world-leading, 
to leading within a supranational region, to leaders within a nation, with firms 
that are stong competitors, moderately capable competitors, or weak 
competitors. 
• The stage of development of a cluster can be embryonic, emerging, or mature 
and the cluster can be growing, stagnating, or declining. 
• The nature of the technological activities in the cluster.  In general, clusters can 
be technology generators, technology adapters, or technology users. 
• The innovative capacity of the cluster refers to the ability of the cluster to 
generate the key innovations that are relevant to competitive advantage in the 
industries in question. 
• The ownership structure of regional clusters refers to whether the cluster largely 
26 
 
(2002) catalogs multiple factors as a benchmarking guide for clusters: R&D capacity, 
workforce skills and availability, education and training, proximity to suppliers, capital 
availability, specialized services, machine builders and software designers, networks 
and alliances, social capital, entrepreneurial climate, innovation and imitation, presence 
of market leaders and innovators, external connections, and lastly shared vision and 
leadership (pp. 18-19).  Fostering an atmosphere conducive to the interchange of social 
capital is a challenge the EU faces as the Union attempts to fortify its mission of 
creating an environment in which organizations, private and public, furthermore formal 
and informal, may maintain a competitive advantage in their respective fields.  
Application for EU funds requires stakeholders to formulate applications based on a 
broad range of specifications, which in turn reinforce the escalating and seemingly 
divergent trends of regionalism and trans-national cooperation.  The question arises as 
to the appropriate level – local, national, regional, European - at which to apply 
resources.   
Tandem initiatives aiming to record existing clusters and to standardize cluster 
metrics include two projects, the Cluster Mapping Project and the Cluster Meta-Study at 
the Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness at Harvard Business School7 as well as 
the European Cluster Observatory8 at the Stockholm School of Economics, both on a  
USA-wide and EU-wide scale, respectively.  The Harvard project has identified 120 
variables to categorize clusters including a dimension based on Porter’s diamond 
analysis (van der Linde, 2003, pp. 132-133).  The innovation strategy at the local, 
national and EU levels may impact the performance of the clusters.   
The popularity of interest in clusters as a policy dimension presents challenges 
of measuring the effectiveness of clusters as well as the effectiveness of policy to 
facilitate cluster formation, viability and survival under the pressures of globalization.  
To address the issue of measuring effectiveness of policy the EU attempts to benchmark 
performance based on established metrics.  PRO-INNO Europe, an innovation policy 
initiative of the Director-General for Enterprise and Industry, started publishing the 
                                                                                                                                          
consists of locally owned firms, foreign owned firms, or some combination o the 
two. 
7 For more details on Clusters and Cluster Development at Harvard Business School, 
please see http://www.isc.hbs.edu/econ-clusters.htm.  
8 For more details on the European Cluster Observatory, please see 
http://www.clusterobservatory.eu/index.php?id=78&nid=. 
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European Innovation Scoreboards (EIS) in 2001.  The EIS 2008 contains comparative 
information about innovation performance at the national level for the EU27 Member 
States as well as for Croatia, Turkey, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland.  The annual 
report uses the nation-state as the unit of analysis.  To counter the limitations of broad 
stroke analysis at the national level, the Regional Innovation Scoreboard (RIS) was first 
published in 2006 using the NUTS 2 regions of the European Union and Norway.  The 
RIS 2009 while providing data for 201 Regions across EU27 and Norway, does not 
include information about associated or candidate countries. 
The European Cluster Observatory Mapping Database uses a Porter inspired 
cluster categorization.  ‘’ (C)lusters are defined by the agglomeration of employment in 
co-located industries’’ (Wise, 2009, p. 17).  Other researchers emphasize the role of 
agents within the cluster in a definition, a cluster is ‘’a dynamic set of economic agents 
located in the same region, active in complementary or similar professions, 
technologies, sectors or markets which join together to form a critical mass which is a 
source of competitiveness in important constituent parts of their activities’’ (Calay et al, 
2007, p. 254).  This definition while including an element on competitiveness may fail 
to include clusters which are in the declining phase of the cluster life cycle.  If a 
renaissance of the declining cluster cannot be achieved through exogenous policy 
impacts, the definition including a competitive element may fail to overlook the ageing 
cluster.  The definition does not explicit address the relevance of institutions created 
through cluster policies.  Wise (2009) defines clusters as ‘’geographic concentrations of 
interconnected companies, specialized suppliers, service providers, firms in related 
industries, and associated institutions in particular fields that compete but also cooperate 
(Michael Porter in On Competition, 1998). Market and competition form clusters’’ (p. 
50).   
The ultimate objective of creating the document ‘’The use of data and analysis 
as a tool for cluster policy’’ aims ‘’to forge a strong, unbiased position from which to 
make recommendations on fact based cluster policy in Europe’’ (2009, p. 4).  The 
document uses a wheel to illustrate the concentric elements of cluster policy research 
and initiatives. 
The European Cluster Observatory collected survey data from 31 countries 
regarding national and regional cluster policy activity.  Quantifying the data from the 
survey can be analyzed through regression analysis to reveal the relationship between 
cluster policy and economic performance and innovation scores.  Quantifying and 
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coding the results from the participatory responses of the qualitative surveys can elicit 
the significance of cluster programs within the European Union member states and 
associate countries.  While means of data collection was conducted under a more 
qualitative nature, the data can be used in a quantitative manner to demonstrate if the 
explanatory nature of the existence of government support through agencies and 
finances for cluster development and strengthening. 
 
2.6   Conclusion 
In conclusion, the evolution of the concept of innovation and the deeper research 
of the economic value of embedded networks fostering cooperation and building social 
capital open up a new arena in which clusters may be defined and studied.  The 
literature does not resound with a unifying definition of what a cluster is.  Even the 
minimal requirements for defining a cluster remain fuzzy.  What remains true, is that 
innovation clusters are linked to economic growth.  By creating policy to accentuate the 
possibilities of transfer of knowledge spurned by social capital and of the increase in 
competitiveness of co-located firms, nations and regions may enhance the development 
of their respective areas.  Social capital facilitates innovation and ultimately to increased 
economic development.
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Chapter III:  EU INNOVATION POLICY 
3.1   Historical Background of the EU’s Innovation Policy 
The European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty, the first of the two Treaties 
of Rome signed in March 1957 did not grant the new body legislative powers to 
coordinate or to finance research outside of a minuscule role in agriculture.  The 
Maastricht Treaty, formerly the Treaty on European Union (TEU), signed on February 
7, 1992 provided provisions giving the EU legal personality to make decisions 
regarding research and innovation.  Article 163 of the TEU made research and 
technological development a Community policy.  Article 163 had the purpose to 
increase the EU’s competitiveness at the international level, as well as to build up the 
technological and scientific underpinnings of industry.  The article also granted the EU 
the power to promote research activities valued as pertinent to the Community through 
other Community policy areas.  Article 165 ensures that Member States and the 
Community create mutually consistent national policy and Community policy.  Finally, 
Article 164 recognizes several Community actions to complement Member State R&D 
activities.  Cooperation between universities and research centers, as well as with third 
countries outside of the EU was promoted through the implementation of programs 
focusing on technological development, demonstration and research, the results of 
which were disseminated.  Article 164 promoted the mobility and training of researchers 
in the Community. 
Innovation and research policies continued to be bolstered by successive 
Treaties.  The Amsterdam Treaty signed on October 2, 1997 granted Parliament a larger 
role in developing the Framework Programs.  Under the Treaty of Lisbon signed on 
December 13, 2007 and entered into force on December 1, 2009, also called the Treaty 
on the functioning of the EU (TFEU), research policy became a shared competence.    
Article 4 of the TFEU specifies that, “In the areas of research, technological 
development and space, the Union shall have competence to carry out activities, in 
particular to define and implement programs; however, the exercise of that competence 
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shall not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs.’’  Moreover, 
the TFEU gave the European Research Area (ERA) legal footing, “The Union shall 
have the objective of strengthening its scientific and technological bases by achieving a 
European research area in which researchers, scientific knowledge and technology 
circulate freely, and encouraging it to become more competitive, including in its 
industry, while promoting all the research activities deemed necessary by virtue of other 
Chapters of the Treaties.” 
3.1.1   European Year of Creativity and Innovation 
2009 is the European Year of Creativity and Innovation (EYCI 2009).  The main 
objective of EYCI 2009 is ''to raise awareness of the importance of creativity and 
innovation for personal, social and economic development; to disseminate good 
practices; to stimulate education and research, and to promote policy debate on related 
issues'' (Europa, 2009).  Economic development rests on the constant improvement 
process provided by innovation.  Since the formation of the Common Market aims at 
making Europe a formidable competitor within the global arena, investments in research 
and development (R&D) seem a natural extension of the policy areas covered by the 
EU.  While the innovation entered the focus of the EU during the 1990s, theoretical 
concepts and competitive value of innovation has a long history in social sciences and 
the business world.   
The value placed on innovation can be derived from the Copenhagen Criteria of 
1993 – Candidate countries must have ''the capacity to cope with competitive pressure 
and market forces within the Union'' (European Commission, Enlargement, 2009).  
Candidate countries must not only have a functioning market economy, but must also 
exhibit the ability to compete within the common market.  Pressures to create an 
innovation strategy stem from the interests of multinationals located within the Union.  
''...(W)ith the goal of increasing their competitiveness in world markets, European 
multinationals pressed for active EC high-technology programs (ESPRIT, RACE) as 
well as the creation of a genuine internal market...''  (Sandholtz et al , 1998, p. 15).   The 
cluster policies of the EU aim to leverage resources dually trans-boundary in 
conjunction with intra-boundary.  ''...(B)oundaries 'lock-in' crucial resources and actors 
within the system and determine the internal configuration of politically relevant 
resources'' (Bartolini, 2005, p. 13).  While Bartolini argues that differentiation will occur 
to establish more highly specialized regions, EU policy seems to aim to take advantage 
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of innovation wherever it is organically or evolutionarily occurring, moreover the policy 
attempts to duplicate and repeat the successes of other successful clusters, the archetype 
being Silicon Valley. 
3.1.2   Lisbon Strategy in 2000 
The Lisbon Strategy was born out of The Lisbon Special European Council 
meeting on March 23 and 24, 2000, during which a Europe of Innovation and 
Knowledge was envisioned.  The Seventh Framework Program covering the period 
from 2007 to 2013 focuses on the Lisbon Strategy developed in 2005, which embraces 
knowledge - one of the three components of the knowledge triangle, completed 
secondly by innovation and thirdly by education.  The Lisbon Special European Council 
met with the objective to invigorate the Community's policies to tackle the creeping 
threat of the twin trends of globalization and information and communication 
technologies (ICT).  A suitable instrument for leveraging the latent and active 
educational and industrial policies for continuous life learning and innovation catalysts 
had already been erected through the Cardiff, Cologne and Luxembourg processes to 
jump-start economic growth, job creation and social cohesion.  Borrás and Tsagdis point 
out that the ‘’EU started to coordinate national economic and social policy areas, 
particularly in education and labor market, where it has no legal competences’’ (2008, p. 
3).  The optimism surrounding Lisbon in 2000 was summarily squelched by the 
economic slowdown, not to mention the more challenging in practice of structural 
applications of the grandiose schemes of the meeting.  One of the core challenges 
associated with the fast paced progression of ICT may leave certain segments of the 
population behind and devoid of the benefits of growth.  A knowledge based society 
requires a review of educational policies to ensure that education and technological 
innovative industries keep pace with one another.  To make the EU more competitive, 
the Union aims to diminish the bureaucratic costs of doing business for entrepreneurs, 
in addition to continuing the liberalization process towards completion of the internal 
market in industries such as gas, electricity, postal services, and transport.  The Lisbon 
strategy, likewise hailed the Euro as an opportunity to further integrate financial markets 
and coordinate macroeconomic policies.  Furthermore, the European social model was 
identified as requiring additional modernization and strengthening in order to raze the 
misaligned treatment of men and women, to overturn latent racism, xenophobia and 
hindrances for the disabled (Lisbon Special, 2005). 
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3.1.3   Lisbon Strategy – Mid-term Assessment in 2005 
In 2005, the Lisbon Strategy was revisited and assessed as falling short of the 
anticipated results.  The results in the mid-term of the project were disappointing, 
failing to hit the goals of growth, productivity and employment.  By focusing on a 
simplified coordination procedure and national action plans (NAP), the Commission 
proposed to infuse some new energy into the policy.  The ambitious agenda was scaled 
back, but retained the main objective of spending 3% of GDP on research and 
development by 2010.   The Commission based its assessment on the Lisbon Strategy 
based on the November 2004 report by the high-level group entitled "Rising to the 
challenge: the Lisbon strategy for growth and employment," which had been requested 
by the March 2004 European Council.  Apparently, a lack of political resolve moreover 
the inability to execute the completion of the internal market in goods and to found the 
internal market for services prove to be the sticking points of the high-level report, in 
addition to a top-heavy agenda, poor coordination and irreconcilable priorities.  The 
Commission realized that it must change its focus from setting goals to preparing a 
roadmap for specific actions.  To re-energize the Lisbon Strategy and to stimulate more 
growth, the Commission intended firstly to make the EU more attractive to investors 
and secondly to encourage knowledge and innovation.  To boost knowledge and 
innovation, the Commission aimed to support investment in research and development, 
to facilitate innovation, the adoption of information and communication technologies 
(ICT) and the sustainable use of resources, and to aid in forming a resilient yet 
competitive industrial base.  This halfway through the period report of the Lisbon 
Strategy relates likewise to governance.  The Commission proposed a simplified 
coordination process focusing on the national program level instead of at sub-national 
levels.  Additionally, the reporting process was revamped to focus on the three 
established coordination tools:  the Luxembourg process relating to labor market 
policies, the Cardiff process focusing on microeconomic and structural reforms, and 
bringing up the rear, the Cologne process dealing with macroeconomic and budgetary 
measures.  A single document will incorporate both employment and the broad 
economic policy guidelines.  The Commission also recommended that each Member 
State should appoint a dedicated resource at the government level to oversee the reform 
process (Barrosso, 2005).   
The 2005 assessment showed that additional incentives would be required to 
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boost the initiatives to bump up the attainment of set goals.  Structural funds were 
identified as a means to revive the Lisbon Strategy and would earmark the paradigm 
shift in the funds in policy from a principle of equality and cohesion to one of 
innovation and furthermore gaining a competitive advantage for EU stakeholders.  
Research and technological development and innovation (RTDI) initiatives merged 
along the historical path to join with regional policy in order to target and leverage the 
small to medium sized enterprises in localities where organic cultures of solidarity 
sprung up (Pellegrin, 2007, pp. 207-209). 
The reassessment of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005 reveals the difficulties of 
managing the periphery from the center, moreover the overlapping nature of boundaries 
within the EU creates a cacophonous web from which it is difficult to extricate 
ownership of a particular reform.  While Europe has a fancy for the exit option, exit 
provides an escape for ownership or responsibility for a particular task.  ''Exit is the 
transfer of a component part from one system to another.  At the most general level, exit 
is always the crossing of an established boundary'' (Bartolini, 2005, p. 12).  Boundaries 
firmly established at the national level to stimulate domestic innovation or technological 
change were initially softened by the Lisbon Strategy; however, the mid-term appraisal 
of the strategy revealed that the national level plays a critical role in coordination of 
policy, since institutions are ex ante entrenched in the broader system of government.  
Established institutions would only be absorbing an additional mandate or even new 
institutions would be created to handle the additional burden of governance.   
3.1.4   2006 Commission Communication - ''Putting knowledge into practice: A 
broad-based innovation strategy for the EU" 
Yet the concept of reinforcing the role of the state in regards to implementation 
of RFDI initiatives under the Lisbon Treaty  is negated when a closer look is taken at 
the wide spanning initiatives of the innovation strategy for the EU as contained in the 
2006 Communication, "Putting knowledge into practice: A broad-based innovation 
strategy for the EU."  Here within, the Commission explicitly admonishes that the EU 
must become an innovation-based society, by embracing all innovation initiatives 
through a comprehensive framework.  What is more, the seeds must be germinated to 
allow the EU to become an innovation-friendly lead market, meaning that consumers, 
both at the individual and organizational levels, are informed and educated enough to 
make consumption decisions regarding advanced technological products as well as have 
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a zest for consuming the latest innovative products.  To make Europe more inventive, to 
allow the EU to innovate at a higher level and faster pace, furthermore to allow 
government agencies and commercial ventures to respond more rapidly and accurately 
to the preferences and needs of consumers, a comprehensive plan of action is proposed 
in the 2006 Communication.  While the 2006 Communication. ''Putting knowledge into 
practice: A broad-based innovation strategy for the EU'' lists the previous attempts of 
the EU to foster a more conducive environment for innovation, firstly, in the 2005 
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs detailing policies and reforms to make Europe's 
regulatory and economic framework more innovation-friendly; secondly, with the 
Commission Communication of October 2005 "More Research and Innovation" 
itemizing 19 fields of action for the EU and the Member States; and thirdly, the National 
Reform Programmes, as based on the Integrated Guidelines of the 2005 Lisbon Strategy, 
stimulating the Member States to take targeted measures to promote innovation, by 
utilizing the Structural Funds.  Despite these three initiatives, the EU economy persists 
in failing to meet its innovation potential (Europa, 2007). 
The Commission realizes in the 2006 Communication that the innovation 
process must involve public and private stakeholders, including business, the public 
sector and consumers.  To encourage cooperation among the stakeholders, the EU has 
and continues to develop policy to hike the level of facilitation of programming and 
funding to produce marketable, profitable products.  Forms of encouragement include 
knowledge transfer between the public research base and industry, strategic partnerships 
between business and universities, the European Institute of Technology (EIT), and 
finally clusters (Europa, 2007).  Regulation (EC) No 294/2008 dated March 11, 2008 
established the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) to unite the three 
sides of the knowledge triangle being education, research and innovation by smoothing 
the effects of the fragmented European knowledge sector, by experimenting and 
suggesting new reference models based on excellence , integrating the economic and 
innovative dimensions into research and education, and finally, by addressing the 
innovation gap (Europa, 2008). 
3.1.5   Towards Cluster Policy 
According to the European Commission clusters are business groupings in the 
same sector of activity (Europa, 2007).  Section 2.4 entitled ''Promoting cooperation 
between stakeholders'' of the 2006 Communication, ''Putting knowledge into practice: A 
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broad-based innovation strategy for the EU'' focuses on the significance of clusters 
within the EU.  The Commission recognizes the advantages which being part of an 
innovation cluster provide for companies.  Clusters facilitate bringing knowledge more 
quickly to market by closing the gaps between resources, business and research.  
Clusters are unique in the fact they increase competition in a cooperative environment.
 Clusters intensify productivity, draw in investment, elevate research, fortify the 
industrial base, and germinate specific products or services and transform into a focus 
for developing skills.  World class clusters, the archetype of which is Silicon Valley, 
draw in the best minds in their fields who furthermore sustain innovation (European 
Commission, 2006). 
Although there may be inconsistencies among agglomerated areas of economic 
activity in regards to dispersion over space and to impact on the local economy, one 
benefit common to most clusters is the advantage of spillovers.  The diffusion of 
knowledge gains fluidity within the clustered locations.  ‘’Just knowing that there are 
substantial spillovers provides a legitimacy to government policy, it does not give an 
indication of how, and in which domains, such an intervention should be performed’’ 
(Guellec, 2000, p. 306).  The existence of powerful spillovers lends legitimacy to a role 
for government policy.  While a role for government institutions is legitimized by the 
empirical evidence of the benefits of the agglomeration of economic activity, the 
absolute objective of innovation and cluster policies can be hazy.  Policy makers need to 
take into consideration both of what Sölvell terms ‘’constructive’’ and ‘’evolutionary’’ 
forces in cluster creation, maintenance, and stimulation. 
The Science-Business Innovation Board (SBIB) suggests three principles on 
which to base cluster policy.  Firstly, ‘’(c)lusters should be based on local strengths.’’  
Secondly, ‘’The European Union and the Member States should aim to provide the 
enabling framework, by, for example, reforming higher education and removing 
regulatory barriers.’’ Thirdly, ‘’Policies should centre on allowing companies, and 
especially small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to grow and innovate, and become 
world-leading in open competition’’ (Aho et al, 2009, p. 8).  ‘’Cluster policies are 
efforts directed at strengthening the economic dynamism of existing clusters and to 
improving the opportunities for new clusters to emerge’’ (Laffitte, 2009, p. 5).  ‘’The 
cluster-approach policies in the 1990s have been complementing these traditional 
sectoral policies (research and development, competition, financial and fiscal 
incentives, employment and vocational training, corporate governance, or physical 
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infrastructure development) by giving them an important territorial dimension’’ (Borrás 
& Tsagdis, 2008, p. 2).  Focusing on local strengths may also include a heightened 
sensitivity to the historical development of the area, which may have played a critical 
role in influencing local strengths.  Delving into several Canadian cluster case studies, 
the volume edited by Wolfe and Lucas (2005) exhorts, ‘’The assertion that history 
matters as much as geography is particularly directed to policymakers attempting to 
help cluster adjust to recent internal and external shocks…to be effective, policies need 
to consider historically rooted institutional dynamics and regional culture’’ (2005, p. 
13). 
The embracing of a ''cluster policy'' by the EU Member States within the 
National Reform Programs, in addition to the support of a ''cluster policy'' in EU level 
Community instruments is supported by the advantages attained for states, regions, 
companies, and individuals through participation in the clusters.  The European regional 
programs for the period from 2007 to 2013 provide a new thrust in regional innovation 
clusters, not only in developed regional centers, but additionally in rural or under 
developed areas.  Operating at a regional level is natural for innovation clusters, since 
numerous commercial enterprises, in particular small to medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) interact with each other at the regional level in centers of learning and 
technology.  The ‘’novel and complex dynamics of multi-level governance (MLG) are 
producing learning processes in clusters’’ (Borrás & Tsagdis, 2008, p. 3).  Needless to 
say, proximity plays a key role in furthering knowledge transfer and collective use and 
interchange of input factors and resources.  
Currently, EU innovation and research policy focuses on producing documents, 
communications and studies delineating the main pillars on which actions and measures 
are to be implemented.  The primary goal of the EU’s efforts are to establish the most 
favorable environment for a world-class research base, to bring to fruition a single 
European labor market for researchers, and finally to promote the ‘’fifth freedom,’’  
incorporating the free movement of knowledge to increase the free transmission of 
research, researchers, and their skills.  Policy trends reveal a bent towards flexible and 
dynamic policy which can respond more quickly to opportunities and challenges.  Both 
demand-side and supply-side approaches complement strategic and structuring efforts 
within EU innovation and research policy.  A heightened awareness that approaches and 
strategies must be specifically designed allows the EU to address the particular needs of 
certain sector and issue areas.  Three policy areas which address clusters include the DG 
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Enterprise, DG Science and DC Regio.  Competiveness is tackled through Enterprise 
and Industry through multiple initiatives including the Lead Market Initiative for 
Europe, Europe Innova, Pro Inno Europe, European Cluster Alliance and the Enterprise 
Europe Network.  Regions policy area supports competitiveness with Interreg IVC: 
Innovation & Environment, Regions of Europe Sharing Solutions.  Research policy 
contributes to competiveness through the Competiveness and Innovation Framework 
Program (CIP). Overall, the policy of the EU attempts to break down the uneven 
development of economic activity and increase the competiveness of the Community by 
targeting research and development, as well as innovation within clusters. 
3.1.6   Structural Funds 
The EU vis-a-vis Structural Funds places a growing emphasis on innovation.   In 
the first period (1989-1993) of the Structural Funds programming, Objective 1 funding 
comprised a minuscule amount of funding, while Objective 2 regions the average was 
9%.  The second period (1994-1999) suggests a growing emphasis on research and 
technological development and investment (RTDI) with Objective 1 areas receiving 
between 2% in Spain and 9% in Austria, whereas Objective 2 regions received between 
10% and 14%.  RTDI infrastructure projects funded enterprise innovation aid as well as 
training and environmental technologies.  RTDI infrastructure includes laboratories, 
science parks, and research centers  (Pellegrin, 2007, p. 211).  The third iteration (2000-
2006) in Structural Funds to the regions saw a more softened approach to supporting 
innovation, as the focus shifted from specific infrastructure projects to financing 
concerns.  Infrastructure strengthening was relegated to the back burner on the focus 
switched to demand-led measures, technology transfer, diffusion and absorption 
capacity.  The 2000-2006 period saw an increase in RTDI investment from between 
5.5% to 7.5% of total Structural Funds.  Studies reveal a link between intensity of 
national R&D as percentage of GDP and the amount of Structural Funds allocated for 
regional RTDI purposes (Pellegrin, 2007, pp. 211-212). 
The EU realizes the critical role that Structural Funds play in helping 
underdeveloped regions to catch up with better resource endowed areas, whether 
physical capital or human capital or knowledge capital. 
   The less developed regions have few chances of catching up with the prosperous 
regions if they do not perform RTDI strategies comparable to the prosperous 
regions. Basically, they are equally exposed to all challenges stemming from 
globalization and competition.  Therefore they have to pursue genuine RTDI 
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approaches if long-term perspectives are sought. Thus, a cohesion policy that does 
not manage less favoured regions progressing fast on this track will fail in the 
long run (European Commission, 2001). 
 
The question arises if the adoption of an umbrella research innovation system 
(RIS) policy will cause a convergence of areas or exacerbate pre-existing advantages in 
regions of the EU.  Bartolini would argue that the cluster policy of the EU tends to 
widen the gap between economically developed divergent areas.  Amiti (1999) reviews 
the empirics of increasing specialization within during the trade liberalization period 
between 1980 and 1990.  The evidence using country Gini coefficients calculated with 
production and employment data from EUROSTAT shows an increase in specialization.  
‘’…(E)ach country’s industrial structure has become increasingly different from the rest 
of the EU countries.  With continuing trade liberalization, we should expect increasing 
geographical concentration…’’ (Amiti, 1999, p. 585).  Empirics may suggest this as 
well, since there is a link between the amount of R&D spending at the national level and 
the amount of assigned Structural Funds for RTDI projects.  In contradiction, the role of 
the state at the national level contradicts Bartolini's view that the role of the territories 
will trump the effectiveness of the national levels of governance.  The EU's RIS policies 
tend to tackle the problems of resource imbalances from every level of issue, whether at 
the national or the regional levels. 
The Science – Business Innovation Board (SBIB) is critical of the innovation 
policy pursued by the EU claiming that EU measures are too broad to be effective.   
 
   Europe needs to focus.  Too many initiatives in the European Union are blunted 
by lack of clarity – trying to please too many constituencies at once, and in the 
end pleasing none. Now the EU is about to embark on another policy initiative 
where clarity and focus are needed. This letter, based on our collective experience 
in academia, industry and policy, is a plea for single-minded efficiency (Aho, 
2009, p. 5). 
 
The SBIB makes a few suggestions to the EU including: build on existing 
strengths; focus resources; be open; benchmark, monitor and be transparent; and 
encourage risk-taking, cross-disciplinary work, bold innovation and experimentation 
(Aho, 2009, p. 6).  The SBIB suggests that priorities of social cohesion, in other words 
convergence of the regions within the EU may not produce efficient and effective 
economic results leading to growth and encouraging local investment.  The research on 
Turkish clusters results in a policy suggestion ‘’to mobilize the potential that exits in a 
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location for a particular area of activity with the help of suitable strategies’’ (Öz, 2004, 
p. 168), which parallels the suggestions of the SBIB.  Bartolini's theory of territorial 
differentiation would line up with the SBIB's and Öz’s policy recommendations to focus 
on the areas of organic clusters, mainly in areas where clusters are already successful 
and perhaps need some help greasing the wheels to attain financing and may need a 
disinterested third party (vis-a-vis local governance) to settle stalemated issues.  The EU 
at the SBIB's suggestion would aim to scale back Structural Funds to areas where the 
funding would be the most powerful catalyst to achieve economic growth.  
Convergence is not necessarily the best method to achieve growth or a competitive 
advantage for European firms in the global economy. 
3.2   Territorial Competition 
The Single Market has a convergence effect, which reduces the differentiation of 
nations or regions.  The lack of control to differentiate mobile factors, creates a space 
for regional differentiation.  Bartolini (2005) provides a theoretical explanation which 
could be applied to the adoption of national and transnational innovation strategies, 
which create a space for competitive advantage in an increasingly homogeneous 
environment of input supplies for production.  Increased competition can only be met 
through the differentiation of the availability of inputs in order to attract companies to 
an area.  The EU's Single Market aims to dismantle entrenched barriers of trade within 
member states, barriers which in the past created advantages for states, regions, or 
organizations.  The development of national innovation strategies, particularly during 
the 1990s, indicates an attempt on the part of the nation-state to reclaim some 
boundaries in providing social contingencies for its citizens.  ''Accrued territorial 
competition'' without any outlet to counterbalance regional shocks in a federalized 
system will aptly lead to the process of substate territorial differentiation suggests 
Bartolini. ''The underlying logic of this aspect of territorial differentiation is that the 
higher the systemic interdependence (the boundaries of the social division of labour), 
the higher the need for localized forms of social integration (the community solidarity 
bonds)'' (Bartolini, 2005, p. 275). 
Bartolini discusses territorial competition and how EU policy impacts 
competition and differentiation.  Mobile factors become more fluid in a single market in 
which movement from one jurisdiction to another can be achieved without salient 
hindrances.  Economic boundaries dissolve or decrease under the EU regime as 
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traditional trade barriers, such as tariffs and quotas are diminished.  The only remaining 
barriers may be social costs and regulatory burdens placed upon mobile factors (goods, 
firms, individuals, investments, taxpayers).  Governments must comply with the 
requirements of European and international competitiveness by changing their 
economic and social policies to meet European-wide market regulations.  ''National 
competitiveness becomes more important, and national programs and regimes are 
exposed to competition that can no longer be contained at the national level'' (Bartolini, 
2005, p. 273).  Bartolini offers a list of empirical changes that manifest the pressures on 
governments for de- and re-regulation: ''(a) the shifting of taxation from mobile to 
immobile factors; (b) the shifting of financing of the welfare state from employers' 
contributions to general tax revenues; ( c ) the limitation of state aids and subsidies to 
domestic industries for employment protection; (d) the pushes towards the privatization 
of previously nationalized industries that protected sectors of the labour force; (e) the 
constraints on public borrowing and the overall public deficit; and (f) the rising 
autonomy of central banks, no longer allowed to extend credit to governments''  
(Barolitni, 2005, p. 273). 
Bartolini continues to posture that the process of market opening in Europe and 
throughout the globe provides less of a carrot for countries to improve their lower 
economically developed areas.   
   In order to foster national competitiveness, governments are inclined to divert 
resources focusing more attention on the most dynamic sectors and territories and 
on those activities that promote growth.  In other words, there has been a certain 
amount of change in the priority of territorial politics: from redressing within-state 
territorial imbalances to fostering territorial endogenous resources and to 
promoting national competitiveness, and from territorial to sector intervention  
(Bartolini, 2005, p. 273).  
 
 Perhaps a stick, vis-à-vis thicker institutions, is the proper motivation to 
encourage the development of underperforming geographical areas. The focus on 
homegrown specialized industries and areas pulls resources from the overall objective 
of evening out the playing field of lesser developed areas in the country.  Each country 
theoretically becomes a specialist in a particular technology or in the manufacturing of a 
particular product.  The state concentrates on a specific commercial enterprise instead of 
fulfilling a social agenda of redistribution of resources to equalize natural imbalances.  
Bartolini admits that social goals may be achieved through the organic formation of 
''territorial collective identities, institutional strength, cooperation traditions'' which may 
41 
 
serve the role as a foundation basis for future investment as well as production of public 
goods.  These unique conditions can ''help overcome external diseconomies of 
competition.''  Bartolini continues that these formal and informal local institutions might 
be conducive, moreover flexible, enough to adapt and respond to the needs of localized 
territories.  Local territorial identities based on ''historical traditions and the endogenous 
resources of a cultural, institutional, or social nature'' may naturally respond to the 
external forces of competition (Bartolini, 2005, p. 274). 
Supply-side and demand-side causality play a role in inducing innovation, thus 
widening the gap of competitive advantage for certain regions.  EU and national 
policies may increase the incentives to innovate.  Demand-side public policies seem to 
have a greater impact on influencing innovation than supply-side policies according to 
the 2009 Innobarometer Gallup survey of 5,238 firms from innovation-intensive 
industry sectors9.  Both a supply-side and demand-side causality are presented by 
Bartolini to explain the possibility of intensifying territorial competition. A potential 
demand arises from the territorial mobility of factors, such as goods, firms, individuals, 
investments, taxpayers.  Without mobile factors, competition for resources between 
territories does not exist; furthermore, there are no customers for whom to compete.   
Immobile factors play a role as well in the equation, as the less mobile factors may have 
to bear the cost (or advantage) of the decisions of the more mobile resources.  At least 
one demand-side policy positively impacted 48% of enterprises surveyed in the 
Innobarometer 2009. Out of all demand-side policies, the newly drafted environmental 
regulations, encouraging or requiring 35% of EU enterprises to innovate proved to be 
most influential on the innovative process (Gallup, 2009, pp. 10-11).  
Supply is created by the territorial differentiation of the production of public 
goods.  Public goods in reference, to transportation, labor market, financing, or tax 
incentives of varying types, quantities or qualities, may be offered in a differentiated 
                                                
9 Aerospace engines, Aerospace vehicles, Defence, Analyt. Instr., Constr. Equipment, 
Apparel, Automotive, Build. Fixtures, Equip., Services, Business services, Chemical 
Products, Communications equipment, Construction / Materials, Distribution services, 
Energy, Entertainment, Financial services, Fishing and fishing products, Footwear, 
Furniture, Heavy construction services, Heavy machinery, Hospitality and tourism, 
Information technology, Jewellery and precious metals, Leather products, Lighting and 
electrical Equipment, Lumber & Wood Mfrs, Medical devices, Metal Manufacturing, 
Oil and gas products and services, Other, Paper, (Bio)Pharmaceuticals, Plastics, Power 
Generation & Transmission, Processed Food, Publishing and Printing, Sport and Child 
Goods, Textiles, Transportation and Logistics, Utility, (Gallup, 2009, p. 4). 
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manner in various regions.  In the 2009 Innobarometer, just one third of the enterprises 
surveyed, approximately 1,750 enterprises, ‘’confirmed that newly introduced public 
policies in the field of taxation or direct subsidies for innovation provided them with 
increased opportunity to innovate’’ (Gallup, 2009, p. 11), when asked if supply-side 
policies positively affected innovation activities since 2006. The capacity of subnational 
or regional territories to differentiate the supply of a public good can fluctuate 
dramatically between territories.  Bartolini explains the relationship as such, ''The lower 
the local resources and the stronger the central hierarchical control of the public goods 
supply, the less possible a differentiation is'' (p. 274). 
Bartolini delves into an expose of the European obsession with exit options 
which helps to explain the emergent possibility of substate territorial differentiation.  A 
brief typology of the dichotomy of the vertical state-society dimension versus the 
horizontal interstate territorial dimension becomes relevant.  In the vertical relationship 
between state and society, state policies impact the competition among social interests 
for resources, while the horizontal interplay of interstate territories reveals competition 
among territorial units for economic development and resources.  In the nation-state 
framework, the vertical state-society relationship is dominant.  The open market of the 
EU fosters an environment for the horizontal interstate territorial competition to 
dominate.  While the salience of the horizontal dimension in EU may appear similar to 
the federalist structure of the USA, it is deceptive, since the underlying goal of the EU 
Single Market is to dismantle the barriers to trade.  Harmonizing regulations across state 
lines may have the objective of free mobility of capital, goods, services and workers, 
but may cause the unintended externalities of diminishing the varying segments in the 
market and widening the gaps of factor prices, economic structure and growth rates.  
Bartolini surmises that EU states and/or regions will tend to become more specialized, 
similar to sector and territorial development in the USA (p. 275). 
3.2.1   Subnational Particularism 
Subnational particularism or new regionalism erupts from the pressure of three 
forces, hypothesizes Bartolini.  Firstly, territorial differentiation emerges from the 
current logic of the internal market's competition.  Territorial and sector interests 
aggregate according to the new logic to form cleavages similar to well-known concept 
of center and periphery of trade and production.  Local interest groups will tend to form 
institutions, which will not hurt them in a competitive way, but may create competitive 
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advantages for them with organizations outside of the territory.  Localized actors with 
similar aggregated interests may seek to pattern functional regimes which fulfill their 
preferences and needs in efficient and flexible methods bounded within the territory.  
The second factor contributing to subnational particularism is EU regional policy itself 
which tends to encourage subnational identities by setting ''incentives for the 
formation...of territorially narrower risk-community and solidarity areas'' (Bartolini, 
2005, p. 276).  This solidarity allows social capital to be banked through similar 
interests.  Borrás and Tsagdis (2008) observe that ‘’most European countries have also 
engaged in a decentralization process of their political structures devolving powers to 
their subnational levels (e.g. regions and municipalities)’’ (p. 2).  The third and final 
factor is the dynamic logic of national political competition (Bartolini, 2005, p. 276).   
I would like to venture that the first factor of aggregated preferences of localized 
actors proposed by Bartolini which contributes to the trend of territorial differentiation 
may result in the formation of social capital which allows innovation to occur within 
clusters.  The regional innovation system (RIS) approach focuses on supporting organic 
industrial districts in order to foster improved knowledge networks and lower barriers of 
access to the critical resources for innovation, particularly financing and social capital. 
 
3.2.2   Social Capital Adds to the Innovation Process 
As mentioned earlier the recognition of the exchange of tacit knowledge in the 
creative process as well as the unique pockets of knowledge and specialization 
contained within firms, institutions or organizations, reveal the competitive necessity of 
collaborative exchanges.  ‘’The emphasis is on the role of ‘tacit’ as against ‘codified’ 
knowledge, in that the former is viewed as being especially dependent on localized 
face-to-face contacts and spillovers.  Indeed, the assumed link between localization and 
tacit or informal, uncodified knowledge is now almost accepted axiomatically’’ (Martin 
& Sunley, 2003, p. 17).  Proximity of knowledge embodiments increases the probability 
of fluid exchange of know-how. 
   The proximity argument holds that, the greater the complexity, uncertainty and 
tacitness of an activity, the more it will require physical as opposed to virtual 
proximity to be transacted. As opposed to more traditional views of innovation, 
the systemic approach plays down the role of tangible techn(olog)ical assets, 
while it underscores the intangible, social, organizational and relational 
dimension, all elements for which proximity may matter. In fact, some would 
even argue that the link between tacit knowledge and proximity is almost 
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axiomatic (Cooke et al., 2004; Kitson et al., 2004). Overall, proximity is no longer 
valued in order to reduce transaction costs as in older static economic models, but 
rather for enhancing learning in a dynamic framework of analysis (Morgan & 
Nauwelaers, 1999). As a result, innovation is considered not only as a socially 
embedded process but also as a spatially structured one (Pellegrin, 2007, p. 205). 
 
 The knowledge based global playing field is dependent upon critical elements in 
the value chain including speed to market, reduction of the life cycle of products, and 
quality design differentiation, customization.  These elements all or in part rely upon the 
outputs of knowledge to function efficiently and produce desired economic results.  The 
successful implementation of the value chain elements requires a degree of social 
capital which is developed through the unique unwritten codes of networks within 
relational infrastructures located within a fairly close proximity.   
 
3.3   Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have provided a brief historical account of the EU’s expanding 
competence regarding innovation policy, as well as the established measures to create a 
sustainable competitive advantage through a knowledge based economy.  EU innovation 
policy incorporates the concept of social capital to strengthen innovation clusters.  By 
explaining Bartolini's hypothesis that regional differentiation rather than convergence is 
enhanced by the trends of globalization and by the removal of barriers for free 
movement of mobile factors in the production and innovation processes, I have 
attempted to show that there is a vast difference between creating policy and 
implementing policy effectively to create an economic convergent effect between 
divergent economic performance of EU regions.  While Bartolini, cites not only organic 
trends to support his argument, he also offers EU regional policy as a force contributing 
to subnational particularism.  As this chapter has shown, EU policy initiatives attempt to 
achieve the goals of economic growth and development by correcting the imbalances of 
regionally endowed resources.  Critics of EU policy, particularly an umbrella regional 
innovation system policy, include the Science-Business Innovation Board (SBIB), 
which urges the EU to sharpen its focus and strategies to achieve its economic 
development objectives.  Pellegrin offers that RIS policy should be catered specifically 
to meet the needs of regions and benchmarking should be adopted to identify and learn 
from best practices.  Perhaps by focusing innovation policy further and continuing to 
lay ownership of RTID projects in the hands of primary stakeholders, the EU will more 
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effectively achieve its goals and produce tangible measurable outcomes. 
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Chapter IV:  THE CASE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THIRD ITALY  
Reflecting upon Robert Putnam's discussions of social capital, I would like to 
explore the development of Marshallian industrial districts in the Third Italy.  Trust is a 
critical element to the successful development of innovation clusters.  In this chapter, I 
will shed light on the historical factors leading to the unique conditions of social capital 
in the Third Italy to allow the creation of innovation clusters.  Additionally, I will 
explore the broader concept of social capital as a crucial ingredient to the success of 
innovation clusters. 
A Marshallian industrial district, which is a concentration of specialized 
industries in particular localities, provides a source of resource exchange, not only of a 
specialized workforce but also of critical technology to achieve a competitive 
advantage.  In order for the system to continue working, self-perpetuating mechanisms 
to prevent cheating must be organic or established through institutional change.  Alfred 
Marshal in the 1890s brought the concept of geographic concentrations of industries to 
the attention of academics (Öz, 2004, p. xi).   The so termed ''Third Italy'' provides an 
interesting research avenue for economic development.  The third Italy was named in 
the late 1970s when the traditional First Italy – the rich Northwest and the Second Italy 
– the poor South showed signs of a deep crises and stagnated economic growth 
respectively.  The concept of Third Italy was introduced by Arnaldo Bagnasco in 1977 
(Hadjimichalis, 2006, p. 84).  The Third Italy glimmered as a source of economic 
progress for the country.  (Ginsborg, 1996, p. 21).  Michael Porter's thoughts are 
summarized as, ''Italian industry's 'remarkable ability' to innovate in products as well as 
to incorporate state-of-the-art manufacturing.''  The SME (small to medium enterprises) 
clusters flourished in four industries:  Textile (Carpi, Prato), Leather (Arzignano), 
Ceramic tiles (Sassuolo) and Furniture (Manzano).  The clusters of the Third Italy 
entailed a long-term process which stood not only on technical know-how, a flexible 
labor force, but also social cohesion.  The linkages formed through horizontal 
interactions between equal peers or organizations create an atmosphere of trust in which 
innovation can be promoted and diffused.  An atmosphere of trust is created through 
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repeated face-to-face interactions.  Institutional form fosters flexibility and opportunity 
for members to interact.    
4.1.1   Emilia-Romagna vs. Calabria 
To emphasize his theory, Putnam selects two regions with relatively similar 
levels of social well-being and economic structure at the turn of the century but varying 
levels of civic involvement.  While the levels of socioeconomic development devolve in 
the two regions over the century, the relative civic involvement levels remain constant 
in each area.  In Emilia-Romagna in 1901, 65 percent of the workforce was occupied in 
agriculture, while 20 percent achieved a livelihood in the factories.  At that point in 
time, Emilia-Romagna ranked at the national median level in terms of industrialization.  
By contrast, Calabria with 63 percent of its workforce tinkering on the soil and 26 
percent sweating in the factories was slightly above the national averages.   Putnam 
adds that the agricultural sector in Emilia-Romagna was relatively prosperous, while the 
industrial sector in Calabria was relatively crude.  The citizens in Calabria were also 
less educated and poorer than in Emilia-Romagna; however, the infant mortality rate in 
Calabria was lower than in Emilia-Romagna.  Calabria ranked better than the national 
average for infant mortality rate, while Emilia-Romagna fared worse than the average 
region.  Needless to say, at the turn of the century both Emilia-Romagna and Calabria 
economies were primitive and backward (Putnam, 1994, p. 154). 
Putnam uncovers an interesting transformation in the Emilia-Romagna and 
Calabria during the eight decades from 1901 to 1977.  Emilia-Romagna's share of 
workforce in industry nearly doubled from 20 percent to 39 percent, in contrast 
Calabria's share of workforce in industry remained relatively constant over the period 
decreasing slightly from 26 percent to 25 percent.  Infant mortality rates naturally 
improved over the period due to advancements in public health and medicine; however, 
Calabria's rate chased after Emilia-Romagna's performance.  In the 1980s, Emilia-
Romagna exhibited signs of a world class, dynamic economy and was easily the most 
advanced region in Italy, in the interim Calabria sunk to the bottom of Italy's regions in 
terms of economy and social well-being.  Between 1970 and 1988, Emilia-Romagna 
leaped from 45th place to 17th place in regards to GDP per capita, whereas Calabria 
precipitated to the bottom of the GDP rankings (Putnam, 1994, p. 154).  One example of 
the high civic engagement of the Emilia-Romagna Region was the creation ERVET 
Regional Agency for Socio-Economic Development in 1974.  Originally operating as a 
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private company with Emilia-Romagna Region as the major share-holder, ERVET 
aimed to create and execute projects to support firm innovation process and improve 
international exchange capacity, to broker agreements between actors (the local 
administration, public entities, social organizations and private operators) to further 
territorial economic development, and technically to assist the region with its program 
execution (Dall’Olio, 2006, pp. 64-65). Putnam stopped his review of vital statistics in 
the 1980s.  To give a more current picture of socioeconomic statistics, EUROSTAT 
provides detailed information.  The regional gross domestic product (PPS per 
inhabitant) in 2006 for Calabria was 15,800 versus 29,900 in Emilia-Romagna, placing 
Calabria in the lowest 40% of the NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for 
Statistics) regions in the EU meanwhile, Emilia-Romagna rates in the top 20% of NUTS 
regions (Eurostat1, 2009).  Data from 2000 shows an infant mortality rate of 3.6% in 
Emilia-Romagna, in contrast to an infant mortality rate of 6.0% in Calabria (Eurostat2, 
2009). 
4.1.2   Emilia-Romagna vs. Calabria, Round Two  
Italy ranks in the second highest quartile of EU countries having firms in 
innovation clusters with 25% to 50% of all firms active in cluster-like environment 
(Gallup, 2006, p. 4).  Emilia-Romagna ranks as the fifth European region by cluster 
portfolio strength with a medium regional innovation system (RIS) with approximately 
33 stars.  Lombardia in Italy ranks first with 41 stars (European Commission, 2007, p. 
8).  Emilia-Romagna makes it twice onto the list of Top-15 clusters by stars, 
employment and specialization in Italy.  With a cluster in production technology, 
Emilia-Romagna comes in second position.  The production technology cluster receives 
three out of five stars with 60, 722 employees and a specialization score of 2.76.  
''...[O]ne star [is assigned]  for each of the following criteria:  Employment size in a 
particular industry cluster within a region, Degree of specialization within the region, 
Cluster focus of employment within a region.  On this basis, 155 regional clusters 
register three stars (8%), 524 regional clusters two stars (25%), and 1338 one star 
(67%)'' (European Commission, 2007, p. 7).  In fourteenth place, Emilia-Romagna's 
Finance cluster holds two stars with 67,184 employees and a specialization score of 
0.98.   Emilia-Romagna is third on Italy's Top-10 regions by total number of stars and 
share of employment in cluster with 33 stars and 75.22% share of employment in 
clusters with stars (European Commission, 2007, p. 46). 
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In regards to EU Regional Policy, Emilia-Romagna is a success story, while 
Calabria requires finances from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).  
Calabria was approved on December 7, 2007 by the European Commission for the 
Calabria Regional Operational Programme for 2007-2013.  The project falls under the 
Convergence Objective with an approved total budget of €3 billion, €1.5 of which will 
be in aid from the EU through the ERDF.  This figure represents 5.2% of the EU's total 
investment in Italy in the context of Cohesion Policy for the period 2007-2013 
(European Commission, 2009).  On the other hand, Emilia-Romagna stands out as an 
economic knowledge based center and will strengthen its position through the Regional 
Program for Industrial Research, Innovation and Technology Transfer (PRRIITT).10   
4.2   Third Italy and the Identification of Industrial Districts 
Putnam brings up a critical question.  ''Through what mechanisms might the 
norms and networks…contribute to economic prosperity?'' (Putnam, 1994, p. 159).  To 
answer the question, Putnam delves into the research of political economists, Arnaldo 
Bagnasco who coined the term 'Third Italy' in 1977 (Hadjimichalis, 2006, p. 84) and 
Michael Piore and Charles Sabel who jointly discuss flexible specialization, which is 
''the paradigm of industrial districts (IDs) with their small, networked, craft industries'' 
(Hadjimichalis, 2006, p. 82).  The identification of Third Italy by Bagnasco in tandem 
with the hints of the designation of IDs by Marshall during the dawn of the 20th century 
lays the groundwork for a body of academic and industrial literature emphasizing the 
concept of innovation clusters or regional innovation systems.  The conceptualization of 
IDs shifted over time and gained varying tautological definitions,  at whose common 
                                                
10 ‘’The Emilia Romagna Region (North-East Italy) is considered to be one of the most 
prosperous in Europe. Its income per inhabitant is over 25% higher the average for Italy 
and 36.4% higher than that of the Europe of 25. Established in 2005, the Regional 
Programme for Industrial Research, Innovation and Technology Transfer (PRRIITT) is 
a network of 57 structures, i.e. 27 industrial research laboratories, 24 innovation centres 
and 6 innovation parks, which have launched 660 projects in 7 sectors: advanced 
mechanics, the environment, sustainable development and energy, agri-food, 
construction and public works, life sciences and health, organisational innovation, along 
with information and communication technologies (ICTs). 
The main challenge is to promote synergies between the research groups which can 
stimulate the transfer of new technologies to businesses. The network is operated by 
ASTER, the technological development agency for Emilia Romagna. ASTER is 
responsible for coordinating the network, as well as launching and conducting strategic 
projects, together with local, European and non-European partners’’ (European 
Commission2, 2009). 
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foundation of the constructional ''concept of local external economies lie the advantages 
of territorial concentration and sectoral specialization'' (Hadjimichalis, 2006, p. 83).  
One definition of Becattini reiterated by Hadjimichalis, which includes and alludes to 
further enrichment of the concept to include human networks, is ‘‘. . . a socio-territorial 
entity which is characterized by the interactive presence of a community of people and a 
population of firms in one both historically and naturally bounded area’’ (p. 83).    In 
Becattini's definition both individuals and firms are critical for the functioning of the 
ID.  Social capital built up over time created trust among the networked members. 
4.3   Social Capital in Italy 
The human element mentioned in Becattini's definition complies with Putnam's 
causal mechanism for the smooth functioning of IDs – trust.  Individuals form social 
networks which are critical for the functioning of an innovation cluster.  ''For political 
stability, for government effectiveness, and even for economic progress social capital 
may be even more important than physical or human capital'' (Putnam, 1994, p. 183 – 
emphasis added).  Social capital may be banked through the incessant contact provided 
by ''networks of civic engagement'' as expounded by Putnam.  ‘’Some of a region’s 
stock of social capital resides in its civic and professional associations, and its economic 
value is deeply embedded in the functions of groups that bring people together to share 
ideas and knowledge’’ (Rosenfeld, 2002, p. 8).   Dense layers of a network of horizontal 
interaction, meaning interplay between equals at a similar social level, guarantee 
repeated interchanges.  As the frequency of interchange increases, so does the likelihood 
for cooperation to achieve mutual benefit.  Putnam offers four reasons to explain the 
powerful side effect of cooperation in networks to make internal parties more 
competitive with external forces.  Firstly, the cost to defect in one transaction increases 
in a network of civic engagement.  If member cheats in one transaction, the network 
may be alerted; therefore, simultaneous and future transactions may be tainted by a 
reputation as a cheater.  In game theory jargon, networks of civic engagement guarantee 
the likelihood of repeated and interconnected games.  Secondly, norms of reciprocity 
develop in networks of civic engagement.  A culture of compliance with the norms of 
the group is inculcated into members.  Reinforcing encounters warrant the transmission 
of mutual expectations to comply with acceptable behaviors.  Establishing a reputation 
of trustworthiness and acceptance of unwritten rules and norms helps to fortify the 
relationships that comprise the network.  Thirdly, the networks provide a highway of 
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communication regarding the reputation of members.  Information about individuals 
and organizations is spread quickly and efficiently throughout the web of contacts in 
order to intercept any cheaters.  Reliable information regarding past behavior and 
current interests of potential partners helps to gird the thickness of the network, whereas 
uncertainly increases risks of the network failure and dilemmas of collective action.  All 
in all, mutual trust increases as participants engage in more interactions, thus facilitating 
cooperation.  Finally, the networks of civic engagement offer a template of past 
collaborative successes, which become ingrained in the networks culture and offers a 
blueprint for future interactions.  In other words, continuity is maintained since 
solutions in the past may be applied to similar exchange problems that may arise in the 
future.  The wheel does not need to be reinvented, when analogous difficulties spring up 
(Putnam, 1994, pp. 173-174). 
Cappellin (2003b) identifies elements of social capital within his approach of 
territorial knowledge management.  
   Geographical clusters…are characterized by a shared cognitive frame or by 
common conceptions and an idiosyncratic knowledge, which teach the various 
firms belonging to the cluster how to look at things from a different perspective.  
Mutual knowledge and trust reduce opportunistic behaviour and uncertainty in the 
overall economic system’’ (Cappellin, 2003b, p. 307).   
 
Cappellin suggests that unique ways of thinking develop over time, which implies a 
lock-in factor.  Boschma (1999) uses the terms ''trust'' and ''social capital'' 
interchangeably (Boschma, 1999, p. 1).  His main objective is to assess the impact of 
social capital on regional economic development.  Boschma borrows the definition of 
social capital from Putnam, ''features of social organization, such as trust, norms and 
networks that improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action” (p. 
3).  Essentially, trust is critical in economic parlance as a means of lowering transaction 
costs, in other words removing risk from the system.  While costs drop, the transfer of 
knowledge increases.  Social capital or trust acts as a catalyst for the efficient and 
responsive implementation of government policy (Boschma, 1999, p. 6).   Cappellin’s 
approach of territorial knowledge management ‘’implies the leveraging of ‘social 
capital’, which is made by the various types of intellectual capital and particularly by 
intellectual relational capital, within a cluster or network of SMEs’’ (Cappellin, 2003b, 
p. 322).  Recalling how Cappellin emphasizes the dynamic role played by territorial 
knowledge management in the implementation of innovation within SMEs can add 
relevance to Boschma’s argument. 
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''...(A)ccording to a large body of literature, a culture of trust could largely be 
held responsible for the industrial rise of the Third Italy,'' Boschma conclusively asserts 
(p. 21).  Boschma illustrates five ways in which the concept of social capital is linked to 
economic performance.  To begin with, social capital proves to be a prerequisite for 
transactions to occur.  Trust reduces the amount of risk involved in a transaction, 
particularly when future payment is involved for goods or services rendered.  Logically, 
societies in which a high level of trust exists, there is a lower reliance on institutions to 
act as a reinforcement mechanism (Boschma, 1999, p. 6). 
In second place, social capital could reduce transaction costs.  Formal written 
contracts which are costly to produce and enforce become extra precautionary or 
redundant in an institution with a culture of high trust.  Opportunistic behavior, such as 
free riding, is strongly suppressed by the accepted norms and accordant conduct of 
network members.  Naturally, the costs of solving irreconcilable disputes reduce as the 
number of judicial complaints slackens.  Boschma sites ''For example, Harrison (1992) 
has interpreted the tremendous growth in lawsuits in Silicon Valley in the United States 
as evidence of ‘potential erosion in the social basis’ for further economic development 
of this region'' (p. 6).  In conclusion, transactions with trust and shared norms at their 
core tend to be less costly and more efficient than state enforced codes (Boschma, 1999, 
p. 6). 
Reason number three demonstrates how social capital encourages the transfer 
and exchange of information and knowledge.  Communication proceeds in a smooth 
fashion, when a high level of trust persists.  Trust facilitates the transfer of tacit 
knowledge which is not physically captured in a tangible form, but requires human 
interaction or experience in order to transmit.  Continued research in the field, indicates 
that innovations more often occurs through human interaction and cooperation than 
through individuals or organizations operating independently.  ‘’In a knowledge 
economy, innovation is based on interactive learning processes, which require higher 
accessibility to knowledge and innovation networks, greater openness to external actors, 
high internal cohesion and also consistent effort in the search for original solutions to 
key problems and entrepreneurship capabilities. Innovation does not circulate on 
markets but on networks. Networks are assets, because they affect knowledge creation 
and generate profits for the firms’’ (Cappellin, 2003b, p. 323).  The bottom line is that 
interactive learning occurs more readily in organizations where there is a high level of 
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trust, leading to transmission of ideas and innovative production of processes or goods 
(Boschma, 1999, p. 6).  Social capital is something that may be built up over time 
requiring patience and effort, but is never automatic. In a United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) report regarding service centers for industrial 
districts, the elements of trust are identified as a necessary requirement to attain critical 
information to operate in an efficient and effective manner. ''The first task [uncovering 
the latent needs of the cluster SMEs] invariably requires the creation of a solid and trust 
based link with the district entrepreneurs for the latter to disclose sensitive data about 
their problems. Initially it is significantly time-consuming, but it becomes easier as the 
reputation of the (will-be)   service centre’s managers becomes better established and as 
communication barriers fade'' (Clara, 1995, p. 8). To function smoothly a certain degree 
of trust or social capital is required for industrial districts or for institutions, particularly 
a service center11, which provides services such as ''credit guarantee, export insurance 
and/or promotion, organization of fairs, access to information on the evolution of 
markets/technology, client rating, consultancy, training, waste management, pollution 
control, quality certification and award of trademarks, product promotion, support to 
innovation, bulk purchase of inputs, and product testing'' (UNIDO, 2009).  Stakeholders 
must accept the norm of cooperation and be willing to act in a manner of reciprocity.   
The fourth way in which social capital aids in cooperation is that trust may 
improve institutional performance.  Civic norms may help to reduce the costly process 
of keeping an eye on politicians and other actors working in a capacity for the public.  
As institutional performance increases, the climate in which businesses operate becomes 
less risky.  High-trust societies tend to have a reliable and trustworthy government.  
                                                
11 The capacity of a real service centre to impact upon the structure of an ID has been 
related repeatedly to the balance between its embeddedness in the local economy and its 
ability to autonomously identify the challenges faced by the district. This balance is not 
a characteristic that can be artificially inspired but it emerges as the result of the 
mutually balancing (but otherwise only marginally converging) expectations of the 
various representatives of the local economy. What is been emphasized is that the 
managers of the real service centre are in a position a) to set the agenda for such a 
process and b) to act as impartial referees for the establishment of a consensus within 
the district. In order to deploy such a capacity, they however need to win over the trust 
and support of the local players, and especially of the most skeptical among them, 
namely the entrepreneurs. Trust-building does not appear to be an especially easy task 
in IDs characterised by a great deal of individualism and bitter inter-firm competition. 
Under such settings, trust can only result from repeated interactions whereby the 
managers of the real service centre and the local entrepreneurs learn to know and 
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Long-term investments become less risky. 
The fifth and final way that social capital facilitates economic development by 
encouraging a meritocracy instead of clientalism and nepotism.  Rent-seeking is sullied.  
People are hired based on their educational and experiential qualifications rather than 
their relationships with someone in power (Boschma, 1995, p. 7).   
4.4   Is Third Italy a Model for Cluster Policy in the EU? 
Trust and social capital as described in the Third Italy case may be a unique 
case; however, the impact of innovation clusters have a similar competitive impact 
wherever the industrial districts have sprung up.  ''Most surprising, however, is the 
finding that many small businesses – or at least the industrial districts that are 
constituted by them – exhibit a dynamism in the creation of new products and in the 
evolution of productive technology which we conventionally associated with large 
corporate organizations.  The technical dynamism of industrial districts is especially 
prominent in central Italy, but it can be found in all of the countries studied'' (Piore, 
1992, p. 307). 
While the majority of opinions in this chapter have been quite positive in regards 
to the results of Third Italy, a more recent article tended to be more critical of the 
relevance of Third Italy as a model for economic development, suggesting that unique 
problems and challenges plague the area. 
   To be sure, mergers, de-localization and the immigrant flow have exacerbated 
problems in Third Italy and require a new approach. But the combination of 
various forms of production, of various firm strategies, of a high-wage core and a 
periphery of low-wage sweatshops, is not a post-2000 development. This kind of 
structure has a long history in Third Italy, which was downplayed for political 
reasons. In this respect the suggestion that Third Italy can be used as a blueprint 
for the development of other local economies and that Italian IDs constitute a 
progressive, even radical alternative, is much more contentious and one that I 
would like to strongly oppose (Hajdimichalis, 2006, p. 103). 
4.5   Conclusion 
Trust or social capital proved to be a critical in the development of industrial 
districts or innovation clusters within Third Italy.  Whether the cases involving Third 
Italy contain valuable lessons, which can be applied to developing countries to boost 
socioeconomic development remains debatable, as some political economists may argue 
                                                                                                                                          
understand each other (Clara, 1995, p. 15). 
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that the path dependent nature of the historical junctures in northeastern and central 
Italy's past created a set of unique conditions under which high level of trust developed 
through iterations of civic engagement. The comparison between the regions Emilia-
Romagna and Calabria emphasize the different trajectories that each area followed in 
regards to institutional formations.  With a tradition of social capital, Emilia-Romagna 
seemed blessed with favorable conditions to align social and economic performance in 
the modern era.  While Putnam would argue that trust allowed industrial districts to 
form in Emilia-Romagna, thus amplifying the intrinsic resources of the areas, Bartolini 
offers a rational perspective based on actors' preferences.  Finally, the pragmatic voice 
of a naysayer regarding the Third Italy's economic miracle in the 1980s reveals that 
Third Italy may not be the economic development role model hailed by many. 
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Chapter V:   CONCLUSION 
This paper attempted to demonstrate how the concept of social capital has 
shaped EU innovation cluster policy.  Social capital is conducive to cooperation 
fostering innovation, ultimately leading to economic development.  The result shows 
that a silver bullet definition for clusters does not exist.  One’s academic or professional 
perspective will determine how one views the phenomenon of agglomeration.  Political 
economists, economists, and researchers from the field of management bring different 
definitions to the table.  The popularity of the incorporation of cluster language into EU 
policy shows the influence of research on policy.  Defining the concepts of innovation, 
clusters and social capital reveal the economic impact on development. 
An in-depth review of Bartolini's hypothesis that regional differentiation rather 
than convergence is enhanced by the trends of globalization and by the removal of 
barriers for free movement of mobile factors in the production and innovation processes 
shows the critical role of policy on the innovation process.  While Bartolini cites not 
only organic trends to support his argument, he also offers EU regional policy as a force 
contributing to sub-national particularism.  As this paper has identified, EU policy is not 
focused only on one initiative to achieve the goals of economic growth and 
development and correcting the imbalances of regionally endowed resources but has its 
hand in many pots to heat up economic activity.   
Social capital proves to be a critical cause of the development of industrial 
districts or innovation clusters within Third Italy.  Whether the cases involving Third 
Italy contain valuable lessons, which can be applied to general EU cluster policy 
remains debatable, as some political economists may argue that the path dependent 
nature of the historical junctures in northeastern and central Italy's past created a set of 
unique conditions under which high levels of trust developed through iterations of face-
to-face engagement. These distinctive characteristics or variables are difficult to 
produce externally or constructively in a different location.  The comparison between 
the regions Emilia-Romagna and Calabria emphasize the different trajectories that each 
area followed in regards to institutional formations.  With a tradition of civic activity, 
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Emilia-Romagna seemed blessed with favorable conditions to align social and 
economic performance in the modern era.  While Putnam would argue that trust allowed 
industrial districts to form in Emilia-Romagna, thus amplifying the intrinsic resources 
of the areas, Bartolini offers a rational perspective based on actors' preferences.   
The identification of agglomeration and clusters as arenas for economic activity 
and competitive advantage shapes EU policy.  The cluster and social capital literature 
lacks a coherent, agreed upon definition or even minimal requirements for 
characterizing the concepts.  Innovation clusters are linked to economic growth.  By 
creating policy to accentuate the possibilities of knowledge transfer and of the increase 
in competitiveness of co-located firms, nations and regions may enhance the 
development of their respective areas.  Attempts to quantify the performance of clusters 
have progressed significantly within the last decade as data collection and analysis tools 
have improved.  Critics of EU policy, particularly an umbrella regional innovation 
system policy, urge the EU to sharpen its focus and strategies to achieve its economic 
development objectives.  Critics suggest that policy be catered specifically to meet the 
needs of regions and benchmarking should be adopted to identify and learn from best 
practices.  Perhaps by focusing innovation policy further and continuing to lay 
ownership projects in the hands of primary stakeholders, the EU will more effectively 
achieve its goals and produce tangible measurable outcomes. 
This paper’s objective is to demonstrate how social capital facilitates innovation, 
which leads to economic development.  The process by which technological advances in 
products and processes are commercialized and diffused throughout society is 
innovation.  In an environment conducive to physical interfacing of networked 
participants to spread knowledge and ideas from one organization to another, innovation 
happens more frequently.  Social capital embedded within the local economy 
contributes to economic development by facilitating innovation through the bonds of 
trust created through shared values and norms, face-to-face contact, and learning.  These 
socio-cultural factors establish a foundation for economic activity.  Globalization forces 
more factors of production to be mobile, while the immobile relational resources which 
are embedded territorially support the reality of functioning networks.  Relationships 
based on collaboration and cooperation, as well as institutional capacities continue to 
increase in importance in sustaining competitive advantage. 
The EU endeavors to foster an environment conducive to innovation.  The 
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Lisbon Strategy places emphasis on the need for an innovative Europe.  The concepts of 
social capital, innovation and clusters support establishing innovation policy based on 
collaborative networks in clusters within the European Union.  Future research is still 
required to confirm the theoretical concepts of the effects of social capital on innovation 
and ultimately on economic performance with empirical data.  Data collection and 
analysis through such efforts as the European Cluster Observatory will help to shape 
innovation and cluster policy in the future, as well indicate to what degree social capital 
can explain overall economic development.  
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